Management HR

Management HR
I :., & ~RS. ARTI1UR BOYtU W. 39MOSS HillRO~l30 J ~~ rW~H~·~MA~~ ••~.•, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ Harvard Business School ~ ( /’, _r: 9-393-055 Rev. June 21.1993 Bitstream Jim Sole spread athin fileofresumes outonhis desk andbegan toreview them.Jimwas president ofBitstream, agrowing Boston-area softwarefirm.Itwas June 1992, andhedescribed the· decisions heneeded tomake tofill aposition thatwas being created tospearhead anew product division: Wehave identified avery exciting opportunity todevelop andmarket anew network printermanagement product.Weengaged aheadhunter todo asearch, and these arethecandidates we’vecomeupwith. Now,Ineed todecide howtoproceed. Background Bitstream wasa$30-million (1992revenues) softwarecompany locatedinCambridge, MA. The company wasfounded in1981 byfour typographers fromLinotype, atraditional typesetting firm. The founders hadanidea forcreating acompany thatwould develop digitized typefonts fordisplay screens andprinters. Thecompany’s foundersweresuccessful intheir efforts todevelop this technology. Thekeytechnological challengewastobuild afont library thatwould consume a minimum ofmemory. Itis astraightforward mattertohave separate digital”bitmaps” forevery size and style oftype. Whatwasfarmore difficult wastheapproach Bitstream took:tohave onlyone digitized bitrnappercharacter foreach style, andtocontinuously varythesize ofthe type using a mathematical formula.Theproblem withthisapproach wasthatnotallthe dimensions ofaletter change atthe same ratewhen thecharacter sizeisenlarged orshrunk. Theheight maydecrease by 50%, forinstance, whilethethickness ofthe letter maydecrease byfar less. Bitstream, however,wassuccessful indeveloping mathematical formulaethatallowed itto store afont library inthis more memory-efficient manner.By1992, thecompany’s revenueswere principally derivedfromtwodistinct linesofbusiness drivenbythis core technology: Professor Michael J. Roberts prepared thiscase asthe basis forclass discussion ratherthantoillustrate eithereffective or ineffective handlingofan administrative situation. Copyright ©1992 bythe President andFellows ofHarvard College. Toorder copies. call(617) 495-6117 orwrite the Publishing Division.HarvardBusiness School.Boston,MA02163. Nopart ofthis publication maybereproduced, stored in aretrieval system.usedinaspreadsheet, ortransmitted inany form orby any means-electronic, mechanical. photocopying. recording,orotherwise-without thepermission ofHarvard Business School. 1 I II • Retail sales:$18million insales ofshrink-wrapped softwarethroughretail sales anddirect corporate sales.Bitstream’s productsincludedseveralfont libraries thatcould beused toexpand therepertoire oftypical laserprinters. OEM sales: $12million inrevenues werederived fromlicense agreements with hardware andsoftware producers. Laserjetprinters, forinstance, typically camewithtypefonts resident intheir software. Inaddition, many software companies, includingLotusandMicrosoft, licensedBitstream technology asaway ofproviding theirsoftware withmultiple typefont capability. JimSole Jim Sole hadbeen hired aspresident inJanuary 1992.Theprevious president, afounder, had been president since1985. Yet,theboard-which includedthecompany’s investors- came to believe thatthecompany’s potentialwasnotbeing maximized. Thus,inthe spring of1991, he left, andthefirm’s chairman andlargest investor becameactingpresident. Heinitiated a search foranew president, whichculminated inthe January 1992hiring ofJim Sole. Jim had been withIBM andXerox forroughly twentyyearsinavariety ofsales management positions.From1978to1983, Jimranaproduct planning andproduct development group forwhat began asa$25 million unitofXerox. Whenheleft ithad grown to$250 million. He spent thenext twoyears (until 1985)helping Xeroxintegrate itslaser printer technology into its mainstream productline. In 1985 JimleftXerox, andbecame president ofasmall company thatmade electronic publishing equipment. Thecompany grewfrom$8million to$30 million andwent public inthe late 1980s. Ihad been recruited bythe venture capitalbackers atthis company whodidn’t want thefounder runningthebusiness. Well,when wewent public, the ves cashed outand lefttheboard. Thefounder wasback incontrol andhefired me. I spent twoyears doing consulting inthe electronic andprinting industries before I was approached aboutthejob atBitstream. Bitstream Jim explained thechallenges hefaced uponassuming theposition ofCEO: There wereseveral problems Ifelt weneeded todeal with inorder tosimply stabilize thecompany, nevermindgrowing it. First, weneeded tostem theflow oflosses. Thecompany wastop-heavy, and the organization chartmade nosense. Itwas sointricate andcomplicated that it would take20minutes toexplain tosomeone whodidwhat. That’s asure sign of trouble. SoIasked agroup fromthemanagement teamtocome upwith a new organization chartthatmade sense, andone thatwecould support atan expense levelroughly 15%below ourexisting level.Iasked another groupofthe 2 · – toppeople tocome upwith afmancial planthatwasmore realistic interms of revenues andexpenses, andwould getustobreak even. And,Itold them that each group hadtopresent theirplantothe other group andagree onitbefore they came tome. In addition tothese issues, theorganization wasfraught withalot of dissension. Theprevious CEOdidn’t liketooffend people, sohe rarely saidno. It became avery political place,withalot ofbehind-the-scenes maneuvering going on.Myanalysis wasthat itwas likeateam withalot ofgood athletes, but no one really knewthegame plan,andthey didn’t knowhowtowork together. My conclusion wasthat Ineeded tobe crystal clearabout whatourshort-term business goals,were,andneeded todevelop aprocess thatwould ensure that people worked together. So, Itold people thatthere wereacouple ofrules. First,ifIever heard anyone making apersonal attackonanyone elseinthe company, they’dbe packing theirbags. It’sfine todisagree withsomeone atabusiness level,butyou cannot havepersonal acrimony. Ialso scrapped theindividual bonusplan,and put everyone onthe same teambonus. Theygottheir bonus ifwe hitour 5% PBT goal, twice theirbonus ifthey hit10%, andonup. The bonus planthathad been inplace wassocomplicated thatpeople didn’treallyunderstand it,and it drove themapart, rather thantogether asateam. I also toldpeople inthe senior management teamthatifthey came tomy office andpresented mewith adecision tomake because theycouldn’t decide,I was going toask them tostate theirpositions andthen flipacoin. Ifigured that=since Ihad just come onboard-I reallydidn’t knowenough tomake an intelligent decision.Theyfigured outpretty quickly thatthey were better off making acompromise thantaking therisk ofacoin flip. I also instituted aMBO-like approach,butwith atwist. Iasked people to come upwith their own6to 10 objectives, andthemeasures foreach. Then, they present theirobjectives andmeasures, andgetbuy-in fromtheother members of the top management group-theirpeers.Atthe end ofeach quarter, theyrepeat this process, andscore themselves onthe previous quarter. People realized prettyquickly thatthey areallon the same lifeboat, andthat they aredependent onothers foranything theywant toget done. People also undergrade themselves. Thelastthing theywant todo ismake afool of themselves infront oftheir peers. Isimply playtherole offacilitator inthese discussions. ( “‘– .. ‘ People alsounderstood thatIwas notgoing toget involved inthe details of their jobs. Iwant them tomake decisions. AndIwant them tomanage their people thesame wayImanage them.Asfar asI’m concerned, managerscanonly demotivate people.Definetheobjectives andgetout ofthe way. Ofcourse, you need tofigure outaway tomeasure andmonitor performance sothat youcan stay ontop ofany problems. 3 I 1 TheChallenge ofGrowth Bitstream hadgrown ata25% rateinterms ofboth revenue andnumber ofemployees for most ofits recent history. Bythe summer of1992, employment stoodat200 people, andwas forecast togrow afurther 15%over thecoming year.Jimtalked aboutsomeofthe challenges that thisenvironment created: . First, onthe financial side,youhave tohave enough controltoensure that expense growthlagsrevenue growth. Inthis process, it’stempting tocut sales and marketing. Afterall,itseems natural thatyouhave toinvest indevelopment and R&D inorder togrow inthe first place, andthat youcanadd thesales and marketing dollars”after”therevenues begintojustify it.Yet, inthis industry, sales arevery proportional tothe number of”feet onthe street,” andthesales cycle is9months toayear. So,you have tobe willing tostay ahead ofthe curve on the marketing andsales expenses. Thismeans youneed adisciplined approach to all kinds ofother expenses, particularly G&Aexpenses likepeople, facilities, and travel expenses. Youneed tokeep yourfocus onproductive expenseslike R&D andmarketing. Also, ifyou’re growing at25% ayear, andif15% isnormal turnover, this means that40% ofyour people arenew each year. Thisimposes tremendous problems interms oftraining, evenjustknowing people. Thissituation is compounded bythe fact that individuals don’talways comeinatthe bottom. And even the”veterans” areaffected byworking foraboss who’s newtothe company. Finally, asyou grow, youinexorably divideresponsibilities andspecialize jobs. So, ifaperson staysatthe same level, theyaregoing tofeel like their jobis shrinking. Andinfact, their responsibilities arediminishing. Yet,while thescope of the responsibilities oftheir position maybeshrinking, therevenue impactof their jobisincreasing. Andit’simportant thatthey understand that.Still, everyone can’tmove up.So,people reallyhavetoswim against thetide just to stay even. Thisfurther complicates thematter ofmanaging theculture soit remains aforce that’sworking foryou rather thanagainst you. The Network PrintManager Project Shortly afterjoining Bitstream, thecompany developed whatJimfeltwas adramatic opportunity forgrowth: We came upwith theidea ofdeveloping anetwork printmanager becauseof all the work wedointhe printing environment. Inmost situations, PCS share a printer. Theyaremore orless “hardwired” tosend adocument toone printer. And, ifthat printer isdown thehall, youhave noidea what isgoing ononce you press theprint button. Youdon’t know ifthe printer isjammed, orout ofpaper. You don’t know ifthere isalong queue, orwhere youareinit. It’s very difficult to use anything butthestandard font,andifyou dosend aspecial fontcapability to the printer, youinvariably screwthings upfor the next person whowants to print. Andweknow thatevery fontvendor hasadifferent nameforwhat may 4 I bethe same typestyle, andthat ifyour printer isloaded withadifferent version than your software isusing, youwillhave problems. Applehassolved alot of these issues withtheir network approach, butnoone hadyettackled thisinthe environment, whichistypically aNovell environment. [Novellisacompany that developed andsold much ofthe software thatallowed PCstobe combined into a network.] As we investigated thepotential, itreally seemed likeaunique opportunity. I have been around longenough toknow thatsomething likethisispretty rare: it requires asynthesis ofexisting technology, ratherthannewtechnology, sothe chances ofmaking ithappen aremuch improved; themarket already exists,and customers areeasily identifiable; it’sanadd-on sale,rather thanstarting from scratch; finally,there’severyindication thatthecustomers reallywanttheproduct. As we looked intoit,we found asmall company inCalifornia thathada product thatgotabout 50%ofthe way toward whatwethought wastheanswer. We looked around andsaw that existing, proprietary technologythatwehad developed couldtakeusthe other 50%ofthe way. And, aswe sized theopportunity, itlooked likeitshould bepossible tobuild a $l00-million businessaroundthisinavery fewyears. Novellisthe premier network company, andwelooked attheir installed baseandasked howbigwe would beifwe were abletosell this product tojust ~%oftheir customer base- $100 million wastheanswer. Wearenow a$30-million company,andeven with 25% to30% growth, a$l00-million businessisstill huge forus. Other competitors hereinclude IntelandHewlett-Packard. We looked athow Novell haschosen tosell tothis market place,andfigured that they hadspent alot oftime andmoney figuring itout, sowe wouldn’t tryto reinvent thewheel. TheyuseVARs-value addedresellers-who marketthe products ofparticular hardwareandsoftware vendors, andwho customize the configuration tosuit particular customerrequirements. Thereisaset ofVARs, for instance, whodesigns andinstalls PCnetworks forcorporate customers. V ARs aretypically $10-million to$20-million businesseswhoearn two-thirds of their revenue fromthedesign, planning, installation, andon-going supportofa system foracustomer. Novell’s VARs allsell PCnetworks totheir customers. So,any customer of one ofNovell’s VARs isapotential customer forour new product. Theeasiest way toget tothat customer isto go toaNovell VAR andsellthem onthe idea of going backtothis base with ourproduct asan incremental sale. ( ,,- ._’ This isachannel wedon’t currently use.Theproduct willbeapiece of shrink-wrapped software,sointhat sense theproduct issimilar towhat wesell through ourretail channel. But,thecustomer isvery different, anditrequires a kind ofsale thatismore similar toour OEM salesprocess. Butagain, the customer isdifferent. Wehave tosell VARs onadding theproduct totheir menu of offerings. 5 BuildinganOrganization toPursue theOpportunity Jim talked abouttheprocess thatledhim toemploy anexecutive searchfirm: Usually, Ibelieve inpromoting fromwithin. Ithink thechances ofmaking a serious mistake aresomuch lower. Often,outside candidates lookmuch better than internal ones.Thisissimply because itis easier forexternal candidates to hide their blemishes. Particularlyatsenior levels,andparticularly insales and marketing positions,peoplearewell skilled inpresenting thefacade theythink you want tosee. Soyou’re leftwith anunfair comparison. Youcangetsome real unpleasant surprises.Promoting fromwithin alsosends allthe right signals about opportunities toget ahead, thecompany’s values,andsoon. In this case, however, Ifelt that some experience withnetworking products and theVAR channel wasimportant. Becauseourexisting products don’toverlap with either networking orthe VAR channel, Ifelt weneeded togo outside. I spoke withPeter Dromeshauser, anexecutive recruiterIhad worked withonand off forthe past 20years, andasked himtoget mesome candidates whoknew the market andunderstood theVAR channel. Iwanted topick asmany brains as possible. Jim offered someviewsonthe hiring process thathehad developed overtheyears: The keyisto get theright brain inthe right job. Ifyou canmatch personal goals anddesires withthejob requirements, youhave amuch better chance of success. Thus,abig part ofthe hiring taskisreally understanding whatmakes the person tick.I’dlike toanalyze andunderstand someoneaswell asagood psychologist would.IfIget the right person withtheright attitude, I’musually confident wecan teach themanyofthe specific knowledge theymayneed. Ilook for intellectual curiosityaswell. Ilike people withavariety ofexperience, some job diversity, someflexibility, Ilike people whomaster asituation, getbored, and look forafresh challenge. I am generally nottooworried aboutspecific priorexperience; Ifigure a smart person canlearn whattheyneed toknow. Besides, there’salwaysanother side toexperience whichcangive people prejudices andbiases. Newpeople don’t have tounlearn thisbaggage. Basicaptitude andattitude aremuch more important predictors forsuccess. AsIsaid, thiscase wasalittle different because I felt that specific experience wasimportant, butIstill feel strongly aboutthese qualities inany candidate. Jim talked abouthisview ofthe job: My vision ofthe job was that itwould require someone tooversee thetailend of the development process,makingsurethattheproduct wewere releasing was exactly theone that ourcustomers wanted.Thisrequired afair amount ofwork with ourexisting organization. Iwanted someone whocould walkinand leverage the resources wehad developed inthe company tomake theproduct assolid as possible. 6 I Thejobrequires someone whoisaseasoned professional inthe sense that they don’t havetobe taught howtomanage abusiness. Leadtimeisour big a antage, andwehave neither thetime northeexperience in-housetoteach someone howtorun thisbusiness. And,while I’dlike anexperienced person,we also need someone withtheenthusiasm, energy,anddrive tobuild an organization. Running thebusiness willrequire recruiting andbuilding adirect salesforce to sell tothe VARs, aswell asfiguring outwho theVARs should beand how to recruit them.Thereisaheavy marketing component tothe job aswell, interms of positioning theproduct anddeveloping awhole communications plan: a ertising, promotion,andsoforth. This willstart offasasmall organization, butitshould bea50-person, $30- million business in3-4 years. In terms ofthe other particulars, Iam willing topay $120,000 forthe right person. Thisincludes $80,000insalary, $40,000 bonuspotential, aswell assome stock options. Ibelieve thisisfair given themarket, andbesides, topay anything more would reallydisrupt thesalary structure atthe company. I haven’t reallyfigured outwhat thejob title should be,orwhere itshould report inthe organization. (SeeExhibit 1for Organization Chart.)Onone hand, thisisaseparate anddifferent business, anditis important formetobe involved. So,itstempting tomake thisperson VPofnetworking products,and ask them towork withme. Ontheother hand, bringing insomeone fromthe outside intosuch asenior position maycreate moreproblems thanit’sworth. I’d like tofind some compromise. TheSearch Jim contacted PeterDromeshauser andexplained thejob, andPeter began thesearch. Peter described hisbackground, hisfirm, andhistypical approach toasearch: I left IBM in1968 andhave been inthe search business since.Ifocus .exclusively ontechnology-based businesses,particularly computersand communications. Iwork forthe largest companies inthese industries, aswell as for quite afew “emerging” orgrowth companies. The challenges ofconducting asearch foragrowth company arequite different. Forinstance, whentherearealot ofventure capitalists onthe board, it gets very complicated. Investorsthinkthattheonly person whowillbe successful inthe job issomeone whohasbeen successful inthat role already. So, if they arelooking tohire aVP marketing, theywant someone whohasbeen a real success asaVP marketing somewhere else.Theproblem isthat these people are usually veryhappy where theyare,andseemostly riskwhen theylook atone of these littlestart-ups withanunproven technology oranonexistent market. 7 I I Therewasatime when thestock options wouldhavebeen abig attraction, but so many people haveseenexecutives inthe industry endupwith worthless stock, that itisn’t asbig adraw asitused tobe. When youarerecruiting someonetowork atasmall company, itis important to figure outifthey areareal decision-maker. Alot ofpeople thatcome from big companies areused tocommittees doingeverything. Atasmall company, you are out there byyourself. Youhave tobe able tomake athoughtful decisionand live with it.At asmall company, youalso need someone whocangetalong with people. Itislike afamily. Thereisno place tohide. You cangetafeel forsomeone’s knowledge andexperience throughthe resume andtheinterview, butit’smuch harder tojudge thechemistry-how a person isgoing tofit with acompany andtheperson that’sdoing thehiring. Every company hasit’sown personality, andpeople tendtohire individuals that they perceive fitthat personality. Whetherit’sa”team player” ora”hard-driving, results oriented desk-pounder,” peopletendtohire intheir ownimage. The value-added byarecruiter likemyself variesaccording tothe situation. After 25years inthe business, Ihave anextensive networkofcontacts. Ican really broaden therange ofpotential candidates thatacompany canconsider. And, I can check someone outpretty wellbefore I even seethem, orhave the client spend timeandenergy looking atthe person. And, I can beanother voice in the decision process. Somepeople relyonmy input agreat deal,andothers less so. Jim called meand told methat hewas looking forsomeone torun anew division thatthey were starting up.Because ofthe nature ofthe business, they wanted someone whohadexperience withnetworking, andwho understood how the companies inthis industry marketthrough V ARs. Frommystandpoint, this is abig help, when someone cangetthis specific interms ofwhat theyarelooking for. After Ispoke withJim,Iwent through whatisapretty typical process. Ihad asked Jimwho hethought werethebest companies inthe industry-who competed in the market fornetworking products.Hehad mentioned Novellasthe best, and also mentioned Banyan,Adobe,HP,Xerox, andIntel. I did some research inorder toidentify thesenior marketing executives at these companies inthe particular rolesthatwould implybothproduct andchannel knowledge. Then,Icalled themupand told them I’dlike achance totalk to them about apotential jobwith acompany thatwasdeveloping anew networking product. Itold them abit more about theopportunity, andasked themifthey were interested. Ifthey saidyes,Iwould tellthem thatthecompany was Bitstream, andexplain thejob inmore detail. Ifthey’re stillinterested, Iask them tofax me aresume, andwesetupaninterview-in person.Inthis case, I had seven people whowere interested, andwho looked likegood candidates to me. Iinterviewed thesepeople andthree people fellout because their 8 I experiencewasn’tagood fitor because thepersonal chemistry wouldnot-in my view-work. TheCandidates Based onthe process described above,Peterhadsent Jimafile with theresumes of4 candidates. (SeeExhibit 2for resumes.) Peterpassed alongseveral comments basedonhis interviews withthecandidates andreference checks: William Wendell: someremarks fromreferences alongthelines of”very political,” “very focused onown career.” Fred Fallon: described byaformer bossas”work hardandplay hard kindofguy.” Chris Cowan: described byone reference as”sometimes abrasive,headstrong, stubborn” byone former boss. Mitchell Madison: Nowmaking (hesays) $30,000 morethanyouwant topay. As Jim looked overtheresumes inthe file, hebegan sifting through hisown mind, trying to sort outwhat thepriorities were.Howcould hedevelop aset ofcriteria thatcould beuseful in evaluating thecandidates, andhow could heget the information heneeded tomake afair and accurate comparison? L, 9 I Exhibit1 Bitstream Organization Chart Jim Sole, President andCEO VP, OEM Sales and Marketing VP, Retail Sales and Marketing VP, Software VPType Engineering Operations VP. Retail Strategic Planning and Business DevelopJrent VP. OEM Strategic Planning and Business Developrrent eFO 10 I I Exhibit2 Resumes (Note:Certain nameshavebeen disguised.) Candidate: ChristopherCowan Education: BA,Ohio State-1963 Experience: 1/89-3/92 12/89-3/92 1/89-12/89 6/86-1/89 1/84-86 1/86-6/86 1/84-1/86 1/83-1/84 3/82-11/82 Novell. A$500-million developerandmarketer ofPC network management systems. Regional Manager(Southwest). Primaryresponsibility wasmanaging and growing reseller(VAR) distribution channels.Majorresponsibility wasselling to end-users. 10direct reports including 5territory accountmanagers, 1national account manager, and2inside salesadministrative/support personnel. Distribution AccountManager. In1989, increased revenuefrom regional/national distributors(VARs) bymore than50%. In1990, ledregion to 132% quota attainment whilemaintaining spendingunderbudget. Designed and implemented asuccessful “Competitive ResponseTeam”withVAR partners. RECOG. A$10 million developer ofomnifont character andimage recognition system. Regional SalesManager (UnitedStatesandCanada). Capturedkeydomestic and international accounts,generating $1million ofcompany’s 1987total of$8 million insales ofthe computer industry’smostintelligent documentprocessing technology. Oneofonly twoperformers totop $1million insales fortwo consecutive years. Delphi Printers, Inc.$300-million manufacturers ofcomputer printers. Regional AccountManager (easternthirdofUnited States). Responsible for industrial distribution withanexperimental thrustaimed atRBOCs. 10direct-, reports. Regional Manager-Distribution/Retail (easternhalfofUnited States). Soldfull line ofcomputer printerstothe Regional BellOperating Companies. Successfully led teams selling tolarge retailers, suchasEntre, Inacomp, Computerland franchises, andtoretail orindustrial distributors suchasMicroAmerica and Arrow. ITEK Corporation. equipment. Consultant tothis manufacturer ofprinting systems Datamarc, Inc.-Eastern RegionalSalesManager. Hendrix Electronics Corporation. 11 I I (ChristopherCowencontinued) 6/80-3/82 6n9-6/80 1%9-1977 1%3-1969 OEM Sales Manager/Regional DealerManager (UnitedStatesandCanada). National Account Manager. Central Regional Dealer. Developed andimplemented anationwide training program forVydec (Exxon). Initiateddealerrelationships withmore than20new resellers. Xerox Corporation. Sales Manager, WPGroup. Selectedtomanage company’s largestword processing sales/support team. Sales Training Manager, WPGroup. Planned,designed, andimplemented a Sales Manager SchoolandanA anced SalesSchool aswell ashighly acclaimed sales tools andsupport materials. Regional ProductManager. Responsible forthe initial launch ofseries 800 electronic wordprocessing systems. Sales Manager, Copier/Duplicator Group.Dallas. Systems ProductSalesManager. Copier/Duplicator Group.Territory included entire southwest, NewMexico, Texas,andOklahoma. Regional ProductCoordinator, (ComputerFormsPrinting Division). Chicago. Responsible forselling computer peripherals toFortune 500accounts. Managed 50-person salesforce. IBM Corporation. Sales Representative. GraphicsProducts, OfficeProducts. 12 I /I I i I I Bits1ream Candidate: Education: Experience: William Wendell BA, University ofColorado, 1981 MBA, University ofVirginia, 1983 1990-Present BanyanSystems. A$150-million developerandmarketer ofPC network management systems. 5191-Present AreaDirector, Northeast. Responsible forallBanyan salesvia- DistributionJReseller channels,VAR and OEM directnational accounts. Managed threeregions anda$15-million revenuestreamin1991. Managing to- $22-million quotain1992. 12/90-5/91 1983-1990 1989-1990 1987-1989 1986-1987 Area Manager NationalAccounts East.Managed Banyannational accounts sales inboth direct andindirect channels. Managed10national account executives covering Fortune 200companies alongtheeastern seaboard, generated revenue of$8 million. Northern Telecom. Multibillion dollarCanadian developer, manufacturer, marketer oftelecommunications andswitching equipment. Director Strategic Planning. Responsible fordesigning andimplementing programs andbusiness partnerrelationships. Significantaccomplishments include formation ofNTs Financial Marketing Program,establishing acaptive leasing! finance organization, andaused equipment/resale organization. General Manager. U.S.KeyTelephone SystemsDivision responsible forall business elements in$150-million divisionsellingmultiple linetelephone equipment tocorporate customers. Manager Enterprise MarketingTeam.Responsible formanaging andgrowing the telecommunications businessrelationship betweenNTand a Fortune 500 enterprise nationwide. Includesmanaging ateam ofmarketing andcustomer, support personnel toachieve andmaintain a”strategic partner”status. • Two consecutive 100%salesperformances. • Negotiated acreative newmigration incentivecontracttodrive additional revenuefrominstalled base,nowanational model. • Successfully implemented strategiesinindependent distribution channels consistent withNTs goals. • Successfully resolvedcriticalcustomer satisfaction issues.Increased service revenues 30%. 13 I (WilliamWendell continued) 1985-1986 MajorAccount Marketing Representative, Houston,Texas. Responsible forNT PBX salestolarge establishment/enterprise customersincludinguniversities, government, and Fortune 500remote locations. • 240% ofquota in1985, #5nationally. • Within athree-month periodidentified opportunity andclosed alarge PBX order withaprivate college toqualify for1985 President’s Club. 1983-1985 TerritorialMarketing Representative, Huntsville,Alabama. ResponsibleforNT PBX salesingeographic territory. •• 14 I Candidate:FredFallon Overview: Successandgoal-oriented Entrepreneurial spirit Creative, flexible,customer-driven approachtobusiness Team player Education: BachelorofScience inComputer Science,May1982; Marketing specialization Personal: Married,onechild, avidBoston sportsfan,enjoy golf,bowling, softball,music. Experience: 2/92-8/92 VicePresident, Sales-Drell Technologies, Inc.Responsible forstart-up and development ofDTI asaleading microcomputer productsalesandservice organization serving Fortune 1000level accounts. Recruit andhire sales andadministrative stafftomarket DTIproducts and services tothe Fortune 1000. Demonstrate abilitytocreate demand forwhat astart-up organization canoffer to large accounts. Grew business fromstart-up inFebruary 1992toover a$7 million annualrunrate by end of1992 byeffectively penetrating targetaccount baseinacompetitive market environment throughface-to-face contact,telemarketing, directmail,and superior customer service. Negotiate relationships withmanufacturers (authorizeddistributorand”best price” to sell and service products in Fortune 1000market Authorizations earned: IBM, Apple, NEC,DEC, AST,Lexmark, andothers. Develop new,incremental businessopportunities andservice products fortarget accounts. Develop andimplement operational procedurestoensure internal controland profitability whileoffering customers aflexible, adaptable organization todo business with. 1990-1992 BranchManager-Microcomputer Solutions,Inc.Effectively manageddirect sales force andoperations foraprofit center generating over$32million annual sales within adesignated territory(3rdlargest of35 branches). Maintained anactive, ongoing roleinnew business development withinthelargest accounts. Negotiated corporatepurchaseagreements withmajor corporations byhelping customers reduceoverall acquisition costswhile maximizing profitopportunity. 15 I (FredFallon continued) Developed andenhanced manufacturer relationshipsthroughaccountplanning and team selling. Variable component ofcompensation tiestoachievement ofpretax profitand other business objectives. Qualified for1992 National Conference. 1986-1990 Computerland, Inc.-NationalAccountManager. Effectivelymanagedmarketing and support activities fornational accounts generating over$13million annual sales. Managed nationwide automation projectsthroughComputerIand’s company- owned branch offices. Business Plandevelopment andimplementation. Responsible forcontract presentation, negotiation,andimplementation. Branch Manager. Effectivelymanagedsales,service, andoperations foraprofit center generating over$11million annualsaleswithin adesignated territory. Negotiated corporatepurchaseagreements withmajor corporations bymatching Computerland’s productsandservices withcustomer’s dataprocessing strategy. Sales increased 25%andprofits increased 50%overprevious fiscalyear. Sales Manager. Effectivelymanagedsalesstaffgenerating over$7million annual sales. Responsible forgrowing profitmargin withincorporate accountsbyselling maintenance, training,andconnective solutions. Named Midwest DistrictSalesManager ofthe Year in1988. Marketing Consultant. Effectivelymanagedsalesterritory andmajor accounts generating over$2million annualsales. 1983-1985 Primus, Inc.-Systems Engineer. Providedpresaleandpostsale supportfor personal computers, localareanetworks, anddata communications. Trained salesrepsandcustomers onapplications ofPC hardware andsoftware. 1982-1983 McDonnellDouglasCorporation–Software Engineer. Programmed onHewlett- Packard minicomputers andIBM personal computers. 16 I ..•. …. – Candidate: MitchellMadison Education: BSBAMarketing, BabsonCollege, Wellesley, MA,1964 Experience: 1980-Present GTE,Telecommunications Division. Developer,manufacturer, andmarketer of telecommunications equipment. 1987-Present VicePresident/Division GeneralManager. Responsible forall telecommunications sales,service, administration, finance,andhuman resources at GTE, including sevencountries, 465employees, withrevenue of$75 million selling telecommunications systems,software, andservice. Met/exceeded profit target forfive consecutive years.Topdivision profitinthe U.S. market during this period. Achieved $14million pretaxprofitin1991. Established separate customer baseorganization toservice 1,000users; developed smallsystems sales force, increasing systemssales90% 1991vs.1990. 1984-1987 VicePresident, PremierAccounts. Managedpremieraccount marketing efforts in the United States. Includedlargestcurrent user/prospects for telecommunications equipmentandnetworks. Implemented firstdivisional, large account, marketing programfor40+ largest usersandprospects. Met$140 million revenue objective. 1980-1984 VicePresident,’ MarketingElectronic OfficeSystems. Lineandstaff responsibility formarketing ofE.O.S. products worldwide. Thisincluded North American SalesandService, distnbutor organization, aswell asthe headquarters staff. Totalrevenue $200million; employees 1,700.Doubled salesrepresentative productivity whileconverting substantial portionsofthe lease basetopurchase. Introduced threenewdata processing productswhilemaintaining currentproduct sales levels. 1964-1980 XeroxCorporation. 1980 ProductMarketing Manager,SuppliesBusiness Area. Responsible forsupplies+ operating plan,manpower, compensation, andbudgeting. Met/exceeded 1980 operating planof$415 million. Expanded largeaccount marketpenetration through customprograms andcontracts withtheFortune 1000. 1979 Manger,HighVolume Marketing. Managedfieldsales activities for2,000 account managers, highvolume salesexecutives, andassociated salesmanagement Exceeded $900million salestarget. Developed marketingprogramsinsupport of high volume duplicators. . 17 I (MitchellMadisoncontinued) 1978 Manager, Commercial MajorAccounting Marketing. Directedallmarketing activities toXerox’s 450largest commercial accountsthrough170national account managers. Met$700 million salestarget Integrated salesofsystems products into national accountmanagement. Reorganizedfieldnational accounts managers on vertical marketbasis,which increased overallproductivity. 1975 NationalSalesManager, SoldEquipment BusinessCenter. Responsible forthe outright saleofall Xerox copiers/duplicators, engineeringproducts,and microsystems. Includedmarketing plans,fieldimplementation, salestraining, compensation, andmanpower. Developedallsales, financing, andservice programs toinitiate outright saleofXerox products. Increasedannualsales revenue from$120million in1975 to·$400 million in1977. Responsible for placing andmanaging branchsalesspecialists in95 u.s. locations. 1964-1975 FieldHeadquarters Sales,SalesManagement, andProduct Management Positions. 18 I