consists of 4 short answer questions and one long essay question. All answers must be written in your own words to demonstrate your comprehension and understanding of the material. Your answers shoul

consists of 4 short answer questions and one long essay question. All answers must be written in your own words to demonstrate your comprehension and understanding of the material. Your answers shoul
SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 Annual Review of Sociology Sociology and the Climate Crisis Eric Klinenberg, 1Malcolm Araos, 1and Liz Koslov 2 1Department of Sociology, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA; email: [email protected] 2Department of Urban Planning and Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095, USA Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020. 46:6.1–6.21 The Annual Review of Sociology is online at soc.annualreviews.org https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-121919- 054750 Copyright © 2020 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved Keywords climate change, community, disasters, migration, consumption, urban, infrastructure, adaptation Abstract What would it mean for sociology to make climate change a core disciplinary concern? This article reviews research on a selection of trends brought on by the climate crisis: (a) compounding and cumulative disasters, infrastructure breakdown, and adaptation; ( b) intensifying migration and shifting patterns of settlement; and (c) transformations in consumption, labor, and energy. While climate change’s far-reaching implications remain peripheral to the discipline at large, sociologists studying these trends increasingly understand the crisis as a central problem for the study of social life. We show how so- ciologists can shed light on core problems emerging from and contributing to the crisis, and also reveal the conditions that make necessary social and cultural transformations more likely. Throughout, we illuminate how sociol- ogy can help chart a path out of the climate crisis by identifying alternatives to the high-carbon, low-equity social structures that organize the modern world. Finally, we identify possibilities for scholars who do not see them- selves as “environmental sociologists” to contribute meaningful research on the climate crisis, and we encourage them to do so while we can make a difference. 6.1 , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 INTRODUCTION What would it mean for sociology to take seriously the fact that the Earth and the seas and the global climate are changing dramatically, that billions of people can already feel the heat rising and the land eroding beneath their feet? We are about to find out, because—if even conserva- tive scientific projections of climate change are right—sociologists born this decade will get their degrees on a planet warmer, wetter, and more unstable than the one we inhabit today. Students, policy makers, and scholars in a number of disciplines will feel an urgent need to make sense of the social causes and consequences of the climate crisis, and an even more powerful compulsion to change things. A number of sociologists feel this urgency now, but climate change’s far-reaching implications remain puzzlingly peripheral to the discipline at large (Leichenko & O’Brien 2019, Liu & Szasz 2019).This article reviews research on a selection of trends brought on by climate crisis— compounding and cumulative disasters; infrastructural breakdown and adaptation; intensifying migration and shifting patterns of settlement; and transformations in consumption, labor, and energy—that traverse multiple sociological subfields. We show how sociology sheds light on core problems emerging from, and contributing to, the crisis, and also how it reveals the conditions that make much-needed social and cultural transformations more likely. Throughout this review, we use the term climate crisis rather than climate change to reflect a terminology that more accu- rately captures the condition of urgency and danger engendered by a heated world (Carrington 2019). The crisis is intellectual as well. It speaks to the perilous state of our discipline in the face of a warming climate, as our slowness to engage pressing socioecological concerns heightens the disconnect among sociology and students, fellow scientists, policy makers, and the planetary con- ditions we collectively face. Sociology has hardly ignored the environment. Foundational thinkers including Weber, Durkheim, and especially Marx created “a rich body of material on environmental issues” (Foster 1999, p. 367). In the twentieth century, however, scholars selectively appropriated this research to build a specifically social science that rejected prevailing physical, ecological, or biological expla- nations of human phenomena. By the 1970s, sociologists had responded to the marginalization of environmental factors by once again incorporating ideas about the relationship between nature and society (Catton & Dunlap 1978)—a focus of continued import in research on topics such as urban greening (Wachsmuth & Angelo 2018, Angelo 2019), human–animal relations ( Jerolmack 2013, Grazian 2017, Bargheer 2018), and the valuing of nature (Fourcade 2011, Farrell 2017). Interest in environmental social movements (Vasi et al. 2015, McAdam 2017) and environmental justice (Pellow & Brulle 2005, Taylor 2014) has since given rise to a healthy subfield of research, albeit one still subordinate to other concerns. The eclipse of the Holocene, the 10,000-year pe- riod of climate stability leading up to the rise of the Anthropocene, in which human activity has transformed the climate and redefined geologic time, upends this disciplinary balance. Today the world is unbalanced, and sociology should be as well. Almost a decade ago, the American Sociological Association (ASA) convened a task force to syn- thesize the disciplinary scholarship on climate change. The project aimed to promote the insights sociology had contributed to climate change research, a field dominated by physical scientists and the disciplines of economics and psychology. The resulting volume (Dunlap & Brulle 2015), with contributions from 37 environmental sociologists, represented the first comprehensive stocktak- ing of sociological research on climate change. The book summarized social causes of climate change, including the patterning of carbon emissions, the role of market organizations (e.g., fossil fuel corporations), and consumption; social consequences of global warming, such as the social distribution of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation; and the sociopolitical actors and processes 6.2 Klinenberg Araos Koslov , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 crucial to societal recognition of climate change and efforts to respond (social movements, public opinion, and denial).In keeping with the ideas that motivated the ASA book, as well as a companion article by Dietz et al. (2020) in this volume, we aim to illustrate how findings and theories from sociology could open new possibilities in scientific fields, policy debates, and planning efforts that show little sociological imagination today. Our primary project, however, is to encourage sociologists who do not focus on the environment to critically assess their subfields in light of climate-linked trends and identify connections between a changing climate and the social structures and processes that interest them, thereby making visible social research relevant to climate change that is otherwise misrecognized. In so doing, we follow Elliott (2018) in arguing that sociology would benefit from a greater focus on the myriad facets of the climate crisis, and we encourage sociologists to bring climate concerns into subfields that have been slow to engage thus far. A distinct environmental sociology makes little sense in a climate-changed world. We now know that burning fossil fuels for power and development—from large-scale industrialization and industrial agriculture to urbanization and expanded consumption—has transformed the underly- ing conditions for all life on Earth. The modern energy system is deeply integrated into our social systems, shaping the routines and practices of people worldwide. For generations, the benefits of these systems appeared to outweigh the costs of the polluting carbon they emit. But in recent years the cumulative toll of greenhouse gases has begun to destabilize the social environment. As of summer 2019, the level of carbon dioxide (CO 2) in the atmosphere is roughly 415 ppm, the highest in all of human history—the highest, in fact, in the past three million years (Willeit et al. 2019). Without stringent restrictions on emissions and widespread adoption of renewable en- ergy, it should reach 500 ppm by 2050, or sooner—significantly higher than that required to raise surface temperatures by more than 2°C and threaten the ecological systems that sustain human societies (and most living species) across the planet. Few sociologists at the turn of the twenty-first century recognized the significance of mounting evidence that Earth was experiencing a warming trend, punctuated by bursts of unusually dam- aging weather. In recent years, growing scientific consensus about the human causes and likely effects of climate change has sparked interest in social research on global warming. Scholars are raising important but difficult questions about how citizens, states, and civic organizations can reduce emissions and pressure fossil fuel firms to do so before we reach a global tipping point, and launching exciting new research on the intersection between climate movements and more tradi- tional social movements; on cognition and the cultural meanings of global warming; on climate denial and climate activism; on humans’ collective responsibility to endangered species; on social concerns related to large-scale climate engineering projects; and on the evolving meaning of envi- ronmental justice in a violent, divided, and unequal world. Space constraints preclude a complete survey of scholarship in all of these areas, and we direct readers interested in these themes to the abovementioned volume, Climate Change and Society (Dunlap & Brulle 2015), which synthesizes much of this research. Together, its findings point to a future in which nearly all social action will be recognized as climate action, and all manner of subfields will grapple with climate concerns. From the beginning of the discipline in the nineteenth century, leading figures studied the most urgent and consequential issues of the time and place: labor, industrialization, class, cities, com- munities, ethnicity, families, and population change. A century later, these topics remain essential, and it is partly because of global warming’s entanglement with them that the state of the climate stands out among emerging issues. Here we highlight promising new research areas; identify in- sights, findings, and questions that chart a path forward in an unstable climate; and explain how sociology can help illuminate ways out of the crisis. www.annualreviews.org Sociology and the Climate Crisis 6.3 , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 EXTREME EVENTS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND ADAPTATION Sociology has a long tradition of analyzing weather-related disasters and uncovering their social causes and consequences by conducting research that illuminates human-made sources of vulner- ability or patterns of harm, whether at the individual, group, neighborhood, or national level. The fundamental sociological move is to show that everyday inequalities—around race, gender, age, neighborhoods, and nations, among others—determine who lives, who dies, or who suffers dis- proportionately. Other social conditions, including the density of social networks and capacity to command government services, often play pivotal roles as well. Tierney’s (2007) review argued for an understanding of disasters as enmeshed with core sociological concerns, such as social inequal- ity and gender. In the context of climate crisis, her urging for disaster research to move “from the margins to the mainstream” becomes ever more critical and, perhaps, unavoidable. For decades, sociologists have demonstrated that there is no such thing as a natural disaster—a task that is now easier, since a core feature of the Anthropocene is that weather is unnatural. This section discusses sociological research on extreme events and disasters in relation to climate change, with particu- lar attention to how such events can inform more equitable housing, community, infrastructure rebuilding, and resilience efforts. At the same time, we show how attempts to render communities more resilient can act as key moments for observing whether and how patterns of social vulnera- bility will be reproduced as disasters become understood and experienced as routine rather than exceptional occurrences.In 2017, a US territory located in one of the world’s most ecologically exposed and historically exploited regions, the Caribbean, experienced the kind of catastrophic hurricane that threatens to form more often in the new, changed climate. Maria, arriving just two weeks after Hurricane Irma took out electricity for half the island’s population, devastated Puerto Rico. The Category 5 hurricane shredded the communications infrastructure, polluted or cut off the supply of potable water, and caused a complete loss of power in all of the island’s municipalities, many of which did not get service restored for 11 months. It severely damaged or destroyed nearly 800,000 housing units, leading at least 150,000 people to migrate off of the island. It tore apart roads and transit systems, generating shortages of food and fuel and causing at least $43 billion in damage. It dis- rupted care in the island’s 69 hospitals and caused as many as 4,645 excess deaths (Kishore et al. 2018, Santos-Burgoa et al. 2018, Gov. P. R. 2019). A conventional sociological account would identify the many forms of everyday vulnerabil- ity and acute political neglect that made Maria so much deadlier than it might have been. It would highlight how inequalities, within both the United States and Puerto Rico, helped deter- mine which people and places suffered most. A political sociology would address issues including whether and how the federal government mounted a relief program and how funds allocated for rebuilding compared with funds allocated to states with comparable disaster experiences. Early so- cial science research on the disaster shows how mortality from Maria spread unequally across the island, with the most severe impact in poor districts (Santos-Burgoa et al. 2018), and how past and ongoing economic, social, and political crises are implicated in the ensuing devastation (Bonilla & LeBrón 2019). Journalistic reporting has documented shortcomings in the federal disaster re- sponse during the immediate event and afterward, when repairing vital infrastructure could have saved lives. Research on the social challenges of climate change opens up new ways of seeing extreme events, as sociologists interested in disasters discover objects of analysis, including infrastructure, previously excluded from the field. Consider another disaster, the 1995 Chicago heat wave, which one of the authors of this review has studied (Klinenberg 2002). Infrastructure figures into Klinenberg’s account of the heat wave merely as background. In setting up his “social autopsy,” Klinenberg notes that Chicago’s power grid was unable to withstand surging demand 6.4 Klinenberg Araos Koslov , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 for electricity from residents and businesses reliant on air conditioners to cool down, leading to sustained blackouts. He also reports that some neighborhoods lost water pressure due to widespread use of fire hydrants for public cooling, that problems with melting train rails and bridge plates contributed to traffic backups and delays in ambulance service, and that the city lacked a system for centralizing knowledge about which emergency rooms had filled and which had space for new patients as the heat wave progressed. Contemporary sociologists—along with anthropologists, political scientists, and geographers—have since developed tools for unearthing infrastructure and placing it at the foreground of our analytic work (Star 1999, Freudenburg et al. 2009, Graham 2010, Larkin 2013). Infrastructure shapes countless features of social life: where and in what kinds of spaces we live; how (and how far or frequently) we circulate; which systems we use to communicate (Castells 1996); what we eat and drink; how we generate and access water and electricity; whether and how we withstand extreme weather; and, of course, the extent to which we advance or lessen global warming (Bakke 2016).One study of water scarcity in Maria’s wake (Oxfam 2018), for example, hints at what we can learn from examining how infrastructure breakdowns are refracted by the social structures and cultural practices that interest sociologists but are often ignored in climate policy debates. As power generation and distribution came to a halt across Puerto Rico, so did water-treatment facil- ities and wastewater infrastructure. Women bore the brunt of these impacts, because on average Puerto Rican women spend far more time than men on cleaning, cooking, and household water management. When the supply was disrupted, women were left in charge of securing, allocat- ing, and conserving available water. They reported elevated rates of health problems related to the shortage, including persistent pain from carrying water, fatigue, skin problems, and illnesses related to cleaning and consuming contaminated water. Observers reported that the water crisis increased depression, anxiety, and stress related to the aftermath of the hurricane. These prob- lems were overdetermined, not unlike the climate vulnerability of the Caribbean more broadly (Sealey-Huggins 2017). Social infrastructure also influences outcomes during disasters, partly because it affects the for- mation of social capital in everyday life. Recent sociological studies demonstrate the significance of social capital and social cohesion in disaster resilience and recovery (Aldrich & Meyer 2015, AP-NORC 2015, Cagney et al. 2016, Aldrich 2019). Whereas classic accounts of social capital formation largely attribute bonds and cohesion to cultural preferences and practices of particular groups (Putnam 2000), the theory of social infrastructure proposes that some variation in social capital is attributable to the quality of physical places and organizations at the neighborhood level (Klinenberg 2018). Accessible gathering places, including branch libraries, community gardens and parks, playgrounds, religious and nonprofit organizations, and certain commercial establish- ments (such as diners, cafes, barbershops, and salons), foster interaction. By contrast, empty lots, neglected parks, and abandoned properties generate stress and anxiety (Branas et al. 2011) and dis- courage people from lingering or socializing in public space. These conditions affect health and well-being on a daily basis. During disasters, they can make the difference between life and death. Urban sociologists have long played a leading role in debates about how neighborhood-level conditions influence local labor markets, crime, social cohesion, group formation, health, and collective action (Sampson et al. 1997, Sharkey 2008, Wilson 2012). Climate change introduces new questions for scholars interested in urban inequality. Environmental justice, a concept that once referred mainly to unequal exposure to industrial pollution and its attendant health risks, is increasingly applied to unequal vulnerability to climate threats, at both the global and local levels. Globally, a cruel fact about climate change is that those nations most responsible for emitting greenhouse gases are best positioned to protect themselves, at least in the short term, whereas nations with the lowest carbon footprint generally possess few resources to do so (Roberts & www.annualreviews.org Sociology and the Climate Crisis 6.5 , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 Parks 2006, Ciplet et al. 2015, Harlan et al. 2015). Locally, a similar pattern holds. In US cities, for instance, poor neighborhoods are typically more exposed to heat waves and more prone to catastrophic flooding, and their residents are more likely to experience morbidity and mortality during extreme events (de Sherbinin & Bardy 2015).As societies anticipate climate change’s worsening effects, sociologists have also begun to exam- ine how practices of prediction and knowledge production shape understanding of extreme events and spur particular forms of response. Klinenberg’s (2002) account of the Chicago heat wave be- gins with forecasts of an unusual weather system, yet neither the social process of forecasting nor the social production of the lethal heat gets analytic attention. Recent work on meteorologists (Fine 2009, Daipha 2015) and the problem of preparedness (Lakoff 2017) suggests that Klinenberg could have productively extended his research into the social world of prediction. The findings might have illuminated a number of issues whose significance sociologists recognize today, in- cluding the question of how meteorologists and journalists writing about weather think about the relationship among climate, health, and society; translate their predictions into the language of policy and public health; and frame extreme events, as Norgaard (2011) examined regarding local media coverage of unusual weather in Norway. [For instance, are such events presented as aber- rations, natural disasters, acts of God, or expressions of a new pattern or new (ab)normal?] What systems of knowledge production (in scientific institutions and media organizations) and social interactions determine these forecasts and forms of communication? Under what conditions do they change, and to what extent do they influence public opinion? Psychologists and political sci- entists pursue these questions ( Jasanoff 2010, Kahan et al. 2012); a greater focus on how we come to anticipate and imbue climate change and associated disasters with meaning would push more sociologists to address them too. The policy and planning tool that cities and nations use to promote climate security in the face of anticipated threats is called adaptation (Pelling 2010, Klinenberg 2012, Carmin et al. 2015). Evidence suggests that well-designed adaptation projects, from sea walls and stormwater storage basins to green roofs and urban parks, can reduce ecological vulnerability, at least until the glaciers melt and sea-level rise overwhelms any imaginable defense. It is widely accepted that adaptation measures are ever more necessary for sustaining dense settlements in coastal and heat-prone re- gions, but what constitutes adaptation is hotly debated. Recent catastrophes in Europe, where between 35,000 and 70,000 people died in the three-week heat wave of 2003, and the United States, where hurricanes have inundated cities and towns along the coasts, reveal that the sever- ity of climate threats extends beyond the world’s most socially vulnerable places. As wealthy na- tions invest in adaptation, it can exacerbate environmental injustice and inequality. Adaptation projects are particularly urgent in areas whose habitability is already imperiled by sea-level rise and persistent drought—environmental conditions exacerbated, in some instances, by the very inter- ventions labeled adaptations (Paprocki 2018)—but many of these places, including the Maldives, Bangladesh, and settlements around the Sahel desert, lack the resources they need to respond. Neither the hard-won Paris Agreement nor any other international climate treaty contains suffi- cient aid to compensate (UN Environ. Programme 2018). Where resources are available, social scientists document how interventions can have unintended consequences such as negatively af- fecting or displacing poor residents. Emerging research asks who benefits from adaptation and how resilience relates to equity and justice (Anguelovski et al. 2016, Gould & Lewis 2018, DuPuis & Greenberg 2019). If Maria’s widespread destruction of Puerto Rico’s homes demonstrated once again how extreme events make visible the marks of long-term social vulnerability, debates over how to rebuild the island and render it more resilient act as windows to observe whether and how patterns of vulnerability will be reproduced. The difficulty of everyday life after the hurricane pushed 6.6 Klinenberg Araos Koslov , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 thousands of families to flee, but Puerto Rico’s depopulation and a lack of safe and affordable housing were problems long before the storm struck. Burdensome and expensive legal procedures for buying or building a house made it difficult for low-income families to perform formal real estate transactions, leading people to build housing that was not compliant with building codes or was informal, unrecognized by the state. This has left many families with uncertain and insecure tenure over their land. Meanwhile, the housing vacancy rate is 18%, and vacant units increased as the island lost about 45,880 households while adding 115,197 housing units in the decade before Maria (Hinojosa & Meléndez 2018, Resil. P. R. Advis. Comm. 2018). Careful sociological analysis of the postdisaster situation and the debate over rebuilding, repairing, and formalizing the housing stock can help untangle this paradox, among others, while revealing processes that contribute to reproducing vulnerability and inequality on the island, with lessons applicable to other disasters.Those who chose to stay in Puerto Rico, or were unable to leave, face decisions about whether to rebuild their homes stronger for the next storm or move out of harm’s way and return exposed areas to the rising sea. In many cases, people find that their agency is limited, and more powerful others ultimately decide. Both options, hunkering down and letting go, are part of the repertoire of ongoing government recovery plans for this and other recent disasters (Gov. P. R. 2019), but the notion of retreat provokes strong reactions: “Dead is the only way they will ever get me to leave,” a man whose roof blew off told reporters (Kimmelman & Gregory 2019). As destruction from extreme events compounds, dilemmas about whether to stay or leave are surfacing with greater frequency, raising a host of questions that resonate with long-standing sociological concerns about how people move and settle. MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT Climate science and social science point unequivocally to a shrinking terrain of habitability in its present form (IPCC 2014, 2019; Sassen 2016; US Glob. Change Res. Program 2018). More frequent and severe disasters, declining crop yields, rising temperatures, saltwater intrusion, tidal floods, and melting permafrost are just some of the ways an increasingly unstable climate system is felt in everyday life. Yet even as physical science fundamentals are resolved, uncertainty remains about the shifts in human movement and settlement likely to result. This section synthesizes re- search on a set of urgent new questions that could form the heart of environmental and climate justice research over the coming century: In the face of escalating crises, who will receive pro- tection to remain in place? Who will be forced to move? At what point will communities start wanting to retreat, and which will be able to do so on their own terms? Headlines abound suggesting that societies are on the verge of seeing mass numbers of climate migrants and environmental refugees, but empirical research shows the complex and variable role of environmental factors in migration patterns and decision making. Environmental change can suppress movement as well as amplify it, or have little to no impact (Abel et al. 2019, p. 240; for thorough reviews, see Hunter et al. 2015 and Adger et al. 2014, pp. 769–70). As Zickgraf (2018, p. 72) writes, “the only consensus regarding climate change’s effect on human migration is that there is no consensus.” Sociological research plays a key role in rejecting the resurgent environ- mental determinism that posits simple cause-and-effect relationships between climate crisis and human movement, with one major focus of inquiry centered on refining predicted patterns of movement under different climate scenarios and various slow- and sudden-onset hazards. In other words (Hunter et al. 2015, p. 384), “rather than asking whether drought causes migration, for ex- ample, researchers are beginning to ask, In what combinations of contexts does drought increase or decrease migration? What are the key micro-, meso-, and macroscale interactions that pre- dict migration-environment associations?” Answers to these questions reveal human movement www.annualreviews.org Sociology and the Climate Crisis 6.b , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 in the context of climate change to be as multifaceted and multicausal as migration more gener- ally, shaped by existing lines of social difference, political and economic systems, cultural practices, social networks, technology, and numerous other factors.Still, the accelerating rate of effects such as sea-level rise points to the likelihood of a strength- ening “climate signal” in human movement (Burkett 2018, p. 463). Hauer et al. (2016, p. 691) found that more than 13 million people on US coasts risk inundation from sea-level rise before 2100, meaning “that the absence of protective measures could lead to US population movements of a magnitude similar to the twentieth century Great Migration of southern African-Americans” (see also Curtis & Schneider 2011, Curtis & Bergmans 2018). Bronen (2010) created the term “climigration” to underscore the necessity of wholesale community relocations being called for by some Indigenous villages in Alaska, where warming is occurring at a faster pace, already result- ing in irreversible environmental change. However, despite government studies recognizing these sites’ imminent uninhabitability, planned relocation has yet to occur due to insufficient funding, inadequate governance frameworks, and policy mechanisms ill-equipped to facilitate collective movement away from hazards, especially in tribal contexts (Marino 2018). In the meantime, com- parisons of local migration rates over time and with less-threatened villages have found, as yet, no evidence of an upward trend, but rather the opposite: faster population growth in the very places that are more at risk (Hamilton et al. 2016, p. 127). Such trends are also apparent elsewhere in the United States. Housing construction in high- risk coastal flood zones outpaces that in less exposed areas (Clim. Cent. & Zillow 2019, Flavelle 2019). Even in places affected by recent hurricanes, one study found “a systemic pattern of ‘build- ing back bigger,”’ with residential footprints growing markedly in poststorm years (Lazarus et al. 2018, p. 759). Sociologists have theorized how and why places become growth-oriented “recovery machines” after disasters. Aid programs geared toward rebuilding property rather than restoring community combine with “a political mandate to (re)build bigger and better than ever as public testament to the resilience of the local spirit” (Pais & Elliott 2008, p. 1420). Yet, they show, the re- sulting growth is uneven. Historical systems of oppression, prestorm inequalities, and poststorm policies facilitate the recovery of whiter, wealthier homeowners, more powerful constituencies typically able to remain—and even enhance their property holdings—in dangerous yet desirable places (Collins 2010, Davis 2018). Marginalized groups, meanwhile, are subject to displacement as rents rise and aid proves insufficient or hard to come by (Pais & Elliott 2008, p. 1432). The vast scale of population dislocation following Hurricane Katrina, in particular, spurred substantial sociological research into displacement (e.g., Weber & Peek 2012). Like forced relo- cation in other contexts, postdisaster displacement threatens dire consequences for those affected. Erikson’s (1976) classic study of a coal slurry flood in West Virginia found that residents were traumatized not only by the initial disaster but also by the relocation that followed. Families and neighbors were dispersed into temporary housing that became long term. People lost their sense of community and networks of social support as well as material possessions. Scholars such as Fullilove (2016) have documented the long-term individual and social costs of forced relocation due to urban renewal policies targeting predominantly Black neighborhoods for demolition to make way for new development—a history that contributed to fierce debates over post-Katrina proposals to shrink the footprint of New Orleans, proposals many residents viewed as urban re- newal under the new guise of disaster recovery and resiliency planning. While a number of Katrina survivors did relocate to areas that were better off by various measures (Graif 2016), experiences of discrimination in these destinations contributed to the decision some made to return, regardless of gains in the new locale (Asad 2015). Extending research on displacement beyond the aftermath of individual events, one study of patterns across the United States found that increases in local hazard damage over time 6.8 Klinenberg Araos Koslov , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 correspond with increased housing instability, particularly for Black women and Latinas (Elliott & Howell 2017). While residential mobility does not necessarily equate to instability, Elliott & Howell (2017, p. 1203) note, “Generally we have assumed a direct connection, especially among less advantaged populations for whom increasing number of moves can become not just a con- sequence of vulnerability but also a cause.” They also acknowledge the converse: Immobility, or staying in place, can likewise be both consequence and cause of vulnerability, as “some individuals and families can become simply too disadvantaged to move” while some “areforcedto move… movement that results from having no other choice” (emphasis in original). Recognition of the harmful consequences of forced displacement and involuntary immobility, along with repeat experiences of extreme weather and anticipation of further climate change, is spurring interest in managed retreat, planned relocation out of the most at-risk areas before the next disaster strikes (Koslov 2016, Hino et al. 2017). While preemptive in aspiration, retreat in the United States primarily takes the form of postdisaster buyouts, funded largely by federal aid. After Hurricane Sandy, for instance, homeowners in select neighborhoods could opt to sell their damaged properties to New York State at prestorm value, on condition that the land would be permanently returned to natural open space, a buffer against future floods and storm surge. In some places, such as Staten Island, where one of the authors of this review conducted research, there was ardent demand and residents organized collectively to lobby for buyouts, with varying degrees of success. In other places, including other parts of New York City similar in many ways to these Staten Island neighborhoods, retreat was vehemently rejected—as it was by the city’s mayor and many local officials, despite state-level support. Questions arise about how threatened groups mobilize in the face of uncertainty, what factors make retreat more or less likely in a given place, and how the process and outcomes work to reshape or reproduce existing relations of power and inequality. Like disasters, buyouts are widespread but typically analyzed on a case-by-case basis, leaving their broader patterns and implications unclear. Decision-making criteria such as cost–benefit analysis indicate that poorer communities may be more likely to be targeted for retreat while wealthier areas receive investments for protection in place (Siders 2019). However, research also suggests that managed retreat funding may favor those who possess the resources, organizing ca- pacity, and relative privilege to access it, as was the case for the predominantly white, middle-class homeowners who pressed for buyouts in Staten Island. A sociological study of buyouts in Harris County, Texas, found evidence that payments for flood-prone homes were facilitating a new wave of white flight; an area’s racial succession from white to Hispanic in past decades was the strongest predictor of whether it later became the site of buyouts, which appeared to go disproportionately to non-Hispanic residents (Loughran et al. 2019). In this way, federal aid distributed via buyouts may exacerbate the same inequalities com- pounded by disaster impacts and modes of response more generally (Gotham & Greenberg 2014). Nearly every US county has “experienced notable property damage from natural haz- ards” since 2000, with observable effects on forms of social stratification and widening wealth inequality—patterns and trends often studied without taking climate change, environmental injus- tice, or inequitable disaster recovery policies into account (Howell & Elliott 2019, p. 2). Howell & Elliott (2019) found that the average wealth of white residents increased in counties that received more aid from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), while the average wealth of Black, Latinx, and Asian residents decreased. Residents with greater predisaster wealth, as well as homeowners and those with more educational credentials, similarly made larger gains in counties receiving more FEMA aid. The short-distance, within-country moves already characteristic of disaster displacement, buy- outs, and other resettlement programs are those most likely to intensify with climate crisis. Yet www.annualreviews.org Sociology and the Climate Crisis 6.9 , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 there are also distinct features of climate change that present novel conditions. First, some places and regions confront looming and irreversible uninhabitability, rendering return impossible and raising thorny political, legal, social, and emotional questions of lost sovereignty and the loss of traditional lands and environments tied to cultural practices and lifeways (Norgaard et al. 2018). Second, nonhuman animal and plant species are moving too, attempting to keep pace with shift- ing habitats. Some species are dying off due to ecological destruction, while others are increasing their range, introducing vector-borne diseases to new locales, among other impacts. Third, no place will be completely unaffected by climate change and the movement of people in relation to its effects and societal responses. This sets the stage for new forms of collaboration and conflict as infrastructure is strained, movement away from one hazard augments risks of another, and retreat by those with most resources threatens “climate gentrification” of receiving communities, setting off further displacement far from initial sites of retreat (Hauer 2017, Keenan et al. 2018).The presumption that certain people and places must inevitably retreat in the face of climate change tends to fall not on the wealthy and privileged but on the marginalized—from small island developing states (Farbotko 2010) to the rural poor in coastal Bangladesh, whose outmigration to urban areas is produced and justified through processes of “anticipatory ruination” that bene- fit environmentally and socially destructive industries (Paprocki 2018, 2019). As with migration generally, there are types of climate migrants whose movement is considered cost-beneficial or profitable and thereby adaptive, calculations that can conflict with people’s own experiences and understandings of risk. The growing concern for “trapped populations” (Gov. Off. Sci. 2011) tracks a broader shift in mainstream migration studies and among associated policy makers toward see- ing human movement as a means of adaptation, rather than simply a failure to adapt. Scholars agree that some people and groups are as likely to become stuck in place with worsening climate change as they are to be uprooted and forced to resettle (Black et al. 2013), but debates persist over the possibility of identifying trapped populations in practice, in part because the term’s normative stance carries with it a top-down assessment of the benefits of movement that may not be shared by those so labeled (Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2018, Zickgraf 2018). Discourses of trapped populations do not typically engage the ample sociological scholarship on forcibly settled, segregated, and contained groups, for instance, people incarcerated in toxic prisons and immigrant detention centers (Pellow 2017, Pellow & Vazin 2019) and Indigenous peoples confined to reservations—a “strategy of containment [long] used by the US to facilitate the proliferation of extractive industries …the drivers of today’s ordeal with anthropogenic cli- mate change” (Whyte 2016, p. 91). In these cases, movement and/as adaptation holds potential to undermine and transform, rather than facilitate, the dominant social and economic systems that contribute to environmental and climate injustice. Such examples underscore the extent to which climate change is not only a force and context for movement and settlement but also an effect of these patterns, partially produced by them and by associated shifts in land use, and sharing some common drivers. At a key moment for theory, policy, and activism in this area, sociology has a pivotal role to play. Regardless of the difficulty of isolating a category of environmental or climate migrant, this category is very much in the process of formation; debates in legal and policy realms center on the possibility of protections for climate refugees or displaced persons, and what funding and governance frameworks for managing climate-linked resettlement might look like. Sociologists are well placed to analyze these classificatory struggles, as constructivist approaches to the refugee category have done (FitzGerald & Arar 2018, p. 391), and to examine how people are making sense of their own experiences, and organizing collectively, in relation to emergent categories and policies, as Elliott (2017, 2019) documented for “flood zone homeowners” fighting reforms of the 6.10 Klinenberg Araos Koslov , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 National Flood Insurance Program. With technologies of border militarization, surveillance, and tracking being marketed and construed as forms of “armed lifeboat”–style adaptation (Parenti 2011) to protect against the so-called floods and waves of climate migrants envisioned in both progressive environmentalist and xenophobic discourses, so too are coalitions organizing at the intersection of immigrant and climate justice, with recent calls to include freedom of movement as part of a Green New Deal that grapples with the United States’ historic contributions to the emissions driving displacement worldwide (Miller 2019). CONSUMPTION, LABOR, AND LANDSCAPES OF ENERGY TRANSFORMATION As emerging ideas for a Green New Deal make clear, climate change has given the sociology of consumption a new challenge. Consumer capitalism, with its reliance on carbon-intensive systems and imperative to grow, created and habituated certain human behaviors that are difficult to change (Clark & York 2005, Elliott 2018). As the climate consequences of consumer capitalism’s “insa- tiable appetite for natural resources” (Beck 2010) become undeniable [see Dietz et al. (2020) in this volume for a detailed review of sociological research on the drivers of climate change], this sec- tion examines how sociologists have sought to answer the salient questions: How and under what conditions do individuals and groups alter their levels and forms of consumption to reduce carbon emissions and mitigate climate change? How do the institutional contexts and cultural meanings of consumption change, revealing new opportunities for individual and collective action? In an- swering these questions, sociologists have also discovered cases of failure: efforts whose promises to lower carbon footprints through transformed social practices, such as sharing economy firms, have not come to pass and may even increase environmental harms.A key insight from the sociology of consumption in the past two decades has been that the ma- jority of consumption is “undertaken to accomplish everyday life” (Gronow & Warde 2001; Warde 2005, 2015). This notion has generated interest in how normalized everyday practices come to ex- ist, persist, or disappear. In this context, understanding behavior changes to reduce emissions and mitigate climate change goes beyond studying the motivating factors behind “green” or “sustain- able” lifestyles, individuals’ choices, or the connection between climate concern and consumer actions. Framing consumption as a social practice foregrounds processes of “recruitment and de- fection” (Shove 2010) into and out of carbon-intensive practices, such as driving or eating meat. Here, a combination of institutional contexts, including government policies, and cultural mean- ings reveal or obscure lines of action that go beyond attempts to alter individual beliefs. Where scholars once focused primarily on individual consumers, they are now paying closer at- tention to the dynamics and opportunities of collective consumption. The variation between these two approaches hinges on the distinction between the terms consumer and consumption (Warde 2015). When the object of study is the consumer, researchers tend to focus on the process of mar- ket exchange and the role of the individual. For instance, studies analyzing “green” consumers typically interview or observe individuals to understand how their personal values, objectives, ex- periences, and circumstances shape what they buy or use, and then situate those accounts in an institutional context (Connolly & Prothero 2008, Elliott 2013, Warde 2015). Such scholarship analyzes the presumed causal connection between attitudes and behavior to understand how peo- ple make choices about what to consume. Given this framing, this body of scholarship sought to reveal determinants of consumer behavior, as a precursor to influencing that behavior (D’Souza et al. 2007, Finisterra do Paço et al. 2009, Young et al. 2010, Elliott 2013). Individual consumer behaviors do help determine carbon emissions in the case of energy- intensive practices such as home heating or cooling (Shove et al. 2012, Steg 2016). Household www.annualreviews.org Sociology and the Climate Crisis 6.11 , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 actions such as buying and using efficient water heaters or fuel-efficient vehicles, among others, could, together, reduce overall US emissions by around 7%. This is significant, especially consid- ering that households accounted for 38% of total US CO 2emissions in 2005, and personal travel accounted for 22% of emissions in 2017 (Dietz et al. 2009, Univ. Mich. 2018). Recent sociological scholarship, however, challenges the individualist assumptions of previous research by asking where individual consumer choices end and social practices begin, thereby raising questions about consumer agency or lack thereof. Scholars such as Elliott (2018) have noted how the most carbon-intensive consumer domains of housing, transportation, and food (Dietz et al. 2009) blur the lines between individual and collective social behavior. Patterns of mobility, eating, home heating and cooling, or washing are also not fully explained by the framing of individual choice or the green consumer as a stable category (Willis & Schor 2012, Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2015). The new role of the sociology of consumption, then, has been to analyze a “socially conditioned actor, a social self, embedded in normative and institutional contexts, and considered bearers of practices” (Warde 2015, p. 129, quoted in Elliott 2018, p. 325). These contexts become landscapes for potential transformation that results less from motivating green consumers than from generating institutional possibilities for new behavior and altered meanings of social practices. Common to empirical studies along these lines is the notion that defecting from high-carbon social practices is not necessarily tied to personal sacrifice or austerity but can produce cobene- fits: increased leisure time, fairer distribution of resources, and strengthened local trust between individuals and groups. Consider, for instance, shifting patterns of consumption related to how people work. The more people work, the more they earn, the more economies produce, and the more people buy and use, with significant consequences for the global climate (Schnaiberg 1980, Foster 1999, York et al. 2003, Clark & York 2005). As wealthy countries fail to decouple economic growth from emissions, some scholars have endorsed a rejection of growth-centric policy and dis- course, instead advocating for stabilizing or even reducing GDP growth (Rockström et al. 2009). Working-time reduction has emerged as a key policy option to reduce emissions while protecting employment (Leete & Schor 1994, Knight et al. 2013). Across countries, the average number of working hours has a strong positive relationship with levels of carbon emissions (Fitzgerald et al. 2018). Proponents argue that reducing working time could have quality-of-life cobenefits, such as higher levels of subjective well-being and satisfaction, even with attendant reductions in income. In the meantime, we note that worsening climate change means that many jobs are becoming more dangerous, not least due to deadly heat (Public Citizen 2018). One of the most significant social benefits of working-time reduction is the increase in leisure time (Fitzgerald et al. 2018). While time-rich households might engage in more ecologically inten- sive activities, such as far-away travel, historical investigations into the possibility of “low-carbon leisure” have shown how swapping work for leisure can give way to low-carbon forms of collec- tive consumption for pleasure. Cohen (2014) defines low-carbon leisure as “indulging yearnings to escape, but without burning fossil fuels.” A historical case from Vichy France documents how workers gained the institutionalized right to a 40-hour workweek and two weeks of paid vacation. As the national government funded the construction of theaters and financed productions, labor unions joined in partnership, often subsidizing access to plays for their members. When the same government legislated two paid weeks off work, the subminister of leisure and sport mandated a 40% discount on train fares for once-a-year trips. Hundreds of thousands took advantage in 1936, and nearly two million did so the next year (Cohen 2014). These historical precedents show how changing institutional contexts, through national policy, can generate new possibilities for collective low-carbon consumption, without sacrificing pleasure. 6.12 Klinenberg Araos Koslov , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 Case studies from a number of industrialized countries demonstrate how individuals and groups have reorganized work and leisure to be less carbon intensive, more fairly distribute wealth and resources, and strengthen local trust—partly by promoting face-to-face interactions (Schor & White 2010). A key commonality among these cases is that breaking away from carbon-intensive practices came about through social movements that reconfigured local institutional and cultural contexts to support such a shift. Schor & Thompson (2014) argue that these local movements represent a new economic paradigm, called new economics, which places at its core the normative importance of fairer and more egalitarian social relations. Adherents commit to decentralize own- ership and management of economic and ecological assets, and broad distributions of skills—with the purpose of strengthening local trust and democracy. The concept of plenitude anchors the dis- course on how people could live differently to pursue ecological balance, fairness, and community (Schor & White 2010). Working-time reduction is a central principle, emphasizing the freedom from the alienating labor relations of the present-day economy to pursue low-carbon leisure ac- tivities, while diversifying risk from an increasingly low-wage and precarious employment context (Schor 2005). Some institutional and cultural shifts that promise to transform social practices and mitigate climate change can have no impact at all on carbon emissions or can even increase them. Empirical research on such failed attempts is as important as research on successes. The sharing economy, for instance, promised to reduce consumption by encouraging sharing or renting existing goods and services rather than producing new ones, but no evidence shows that consumption or emissions have declined as a result. In fact, some scholars suggest that these services induce demands lead- ing to even higher emissions—for example, by encouraging far-away travel in the case of Airbnb, where lower costs for accommodation might be offset by flying longer distances to destinations (Schor & Attwood-Charles 2017). Promises of social benefits from the sharing economy have not delivered, either. Consider Airbnb, which said it would generate social opportunities for users but wound up promoting gentrification of low-income neighborhoods (Ladegaard 2018, Wachsmuth & Weisler 2018). It is instructive to contrast this outcome with burgeoning sociological research that explores how to reduce emissions and enhance urban sustainability by centering housing jus- tice, collective consumption, and more “democratic ecologies” (Cohen 2019a,b; Rice et al. 2019). Officials in postindustrial urban centers often boast that their cities have small carbon foot- prints due to their built density; extensive public transport networks; and knowledge-intensive, high-tech firms. This discourse obscures cities’ dependence on polluting activities elsewhere. In the case of high-tech firms, computers and smartphones produce global flows of electronic waste, and data centers holding information in the cloud account for 2% of global emissions, a share ex- pected to triple in the next decade (Bawden 2016). The low-carbon footprints of dense settlements such as Manhattan and San Francisco can also be deceptive, as carbon accounting methods do not typically consider or measure consumption, with associated emission counts outsourced beyond city limits. Carbon counts attribute emissions resulting from in-city activities and power plants but tend not to incorporate the full life cycle of emissions for all goods and services consumed, or emissions resulting from air travel (Wachsmuth et al. 2016, Rice et al. 2019). If and when societies rapidly decarbonize, rural landscapes will likely be transformed to har- ness wind and solar energy. How the transition takes place will be crucial, as renewable energy development holds potential either to imitate the extractive political and institutional patterns of coal, oil, and gas or to take a different trajectory altogether (Mitchell 2011). Just as colonial and foreign corporate “extractivism” benefited affluent patrons and regions at others’ expense, so too is there a danger that “green capitalist” renewable energy initiatives will emerge as new modes of resource exploitation legitimized by the urgency of decarbonization. Drawing on fieldwork from a large-scale initiative to develop a wind energy project in Mexico’s Oaxaca province, Howe & www.annualreviews.org Sociology and the Climate Crisis 6.13 , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 Boyer (2016) document how transition has largely failed to link sustainable energy to more robust benefits for local populations. Large-scale renewable projects in southern Mexico have tended to prioritize the interests of international investors and federal officials over local concerns about cultural and environmental impacts. Meanwhile, renewable energy in the form of land-intensive strategies such as hydropower drives increasing displacement, and untested geoengineering ini- tiatives threaten to do the same (Randell 2018). Renewable energy projects often follow extractive frameworks that defined colonialism and run the risk of producing backlash. Howe & Boyer (2016) document how local movements and alternative approaches can arise in response, describing ef- forts to create the first community-owned wind park in Latin America. The lesson is that the renewable energy transition’s success depends not only on technical and economic conditions for replacing carbon energy but also on whether new energy projects can be enacted more equitably, with greater social support and attention to local resource sovereignty.There is no shortage of productive questions for those concerned with promoting social transformation in response to climate change by means of collective consumption. Sociologists could profitably revisit the question of how the 40-hour-or-more workweek became normalized, through institutions and policies as well as the enactment of religiously rooted moral orders and associated cultural significance of “hard work.” They could also study how people have orga- nized resistance to and defected from such practices. How, for example, are state policies and cul- tural meanings shifting to bring about the possibility of working-time reduction in places such as Germany? Outside the workplace, sociologists could examine questions about the normalization of inefficient air conditioning and other household appliances, or inefficient building construction that fails to insulate against increasingly frequent and deadly heat waves. Sidestepping “green” moralizing about consumer choices, sociologists have room to attend further to institutional con- texts as the key sites for analysis and intervention. CONCLUSION The climate crisis is decisively shaping contemporary social life and creating a new wave of social problems. Sociology will eventually incorporate socioecological concerns into its core fields—the only question is whether this will happen quickly enough for the discipline to remain relevant to students and fellow scientists, useful to policy makers, and interesting to those who want to understand life and death on our warming planet. The climate crisis will not merely change sociology. Soon, perhaps sooner than most anticipate, it will transform the way we do social science. While basic research will continue to be driven by theoretical questions, the project of doing research for research’s sake makes little sense in a full climate crisis, in which our species scrambles to sustain itself and other forms of life on Earth. Consider that as we write this article in the summer of 2019 in the privilege of overcooled offices, record-breaking temperatures are rippling across the world. Enormous swaths of Arctic tundra are on fire, releasing methane that accelerates the warming potential of CO 2, while the melting of Greenland’s vast ice sheets threatens to dramatically increase sea-level rise. If environmental impacts expected to come by midcentury are making themselves felt now, imagine what problems sociologists will be studying in 2050. Housing and community are two themes that run throughout this review. During extreme events, homes are, for many, the front line of protective infrastructure. When homes fail to in- sulate from the heat, get battered and damaged, or wash away, bonds between people and their surrounding communities can determine how people survive and recover, as can the broader po- litical economies of housing and longer histories of marginalization and disinvestment at the root of other societal crises. Furthermore, either after disasters or in the face of a slowly shrinking band 6.14 Klinenberg Araos Koslov , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55 of human habitability, people must choose whether and how to relocate their homes, and how to maintain or recreate their communities or integrate into new ones should they be compelled to settle in new places away from particular hazards. Of course, people will not be able to choose the choices that will be available. The state, whether at the municipal, regional, or national level, will play a crucial role in shaping local options. Finally, how these actions translate into larger landscape transformations, and how people build, heat, and power their homes and organize their communities on an everyday basis, can strongly determine their carbon footprint. Here, again, the state will play a major role in shaping what happens.Following the tradition of Olin-Wright’s (2010) Real Utopias project, sociology could play a vital role in not only documenting problems that emerge in conjunction with climate crisis but also illuminating successes, showing how states and societies lower their carbon emissions, how experiences with disasters or social movements inform fairer and more equitable rebuilding and resilience efforts, or how communities gain agency over decisions about where and how to settle amid ecological change. Following more critical traditions, sociology could also interrogate frauds and failures, from the greenwashing campaigns of fossil fuel companies that use ecological lan- guage to legitimate carbon-intensive energy systems to sharing economy firms that promote their products with unfounded claims about their role in mitigating environmental harm. Whatever the method, whichever the theory, the sociology of climate change could help states and societies identify alternatives to the high-carbon, low-equity social structures that organize the modern world. If it does not, then we have failed. Return to the early days of environmental sociology: The subfield arose in response to the discipline’s perceived anthropocentrism; its original stated goal was to introduce biophysical or ecological variables into empirical social research (Dunlap 2002, Pellow & Brehm 2013). Much research published since has followed in this vein, and for four decades the mainstream of environ- mental sociology has analyzed the relationships between ecological variables (e.g., CO 2emissions or air pollution) and social or economic outcomes (e.g., income, GDP, or health). This research, while often rigorous and crucial to uncover the coconstitution of nature and society, cannot alone generate solutions for the climate crisis, which demands new theorizing across the discipline and its subfields, many of which have insights to contribute but have yet to situate their work in the context of climate change. That is a loss not only for sociology but for everyone who cares about what happens in the crisis. That should be all of us, because everything is at stake. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors thank Hillary Angelo, Max Besbris, Matthew Hauer, Andrew Lakoff, Alix Rule, and Patrick Sharkey for feedback on the initial manuscript, as well as the anonymous reviewers at the Annual Review of Sociology. This article benefited from conversations with participants in the working group on the Social Challenges of Climate Change, at New York University’s Institute for Public Knowledge. LITERATURE CITED Abel GJ, Brottrager M, Cuaresma JC, Muttarak R. 2019. Climate, conflict and forced migration. Glob. Environ. Change 54:239–49 www.annualreviews.org Sociology and the Climate Crisis 6.15 , .• · �- Review in Advance first posted on March 2, 20 20 . (Changes may still occur before final publication.) Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2020.46. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 207.241.225.227 on 05/07/20. For personal use only. SO46CH06_Klinenberg ARjats.cls February 22, 2020 8:55Adger WN, Pulhin JM, Barnett J, Dabelko GD, Hovelsrud GK, et al. 2014. 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consists of 4 short answer questions and one long essay question. All answers must be written in your own words to demonstrate your comprehension and understanding of the material. Your answers shoul
49 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns SAIS Review vol. XXIX no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2009) 49 © 2009 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, Moments, Mutations Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner In this article, we analyze the connections between neoliberalization processes and urban transformations. Cities have become strategically central sites in the uneven, crisis-laden advance of neoliberal restructuring projects. However, in contrast to neoliberal ideology, our analysis draws attention to the path-dependent interactions between neoliberal projects of restructuring and inherited institutional and spatial landscapes. Accordingly, we empha – size the geographically variable, yet multiscalar and translocally interconnected, nature of neoliberal urbanism. We also suggest that cities are sites of serial policy failure as well as resistance to neoliberal programs of urban restructuring. For these reasons, urban regions provide an important reference point for understanding some of the limits, contradictions and mutations of the neoliberal project since the 1990s. Introduction I n this article, we analyze the connections between neoliberalization pro- cesses and urban transformations. Cities have become strategically central sites in the uneven, crisis-laden advance of neoliberal restructuring projects. However, in contrast to neoliberal ideology, our analysis draws attention to the path-dependent interactions between neoliberal projects of restruc- turing and inherited institutional and spatial landscapes. Accordingly, we emphasize the geographically variable, yet multiscalar and translocally in- terconnected, nature of neoliberal urbanism. We also suggest that cities are sites of serial policy failure as well as resistance to neoliberal programs of urban restructuring. For these reasons, urban regions provide an important reference point for understanding some of the limits, contradictions and mutations of the neoliberal project since the 1990s. We begin by presenting the methodological foundations for our analy- sis, which are summarized through the concept of “actually existing neolib- eralism.” Whereas neoliberal ideology assumes that market forces operate according to immutable laws no matter where they are unleashed, the con- cept of “actually existing neoliberalism” draws attention to the contextual Jamie Peck is in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia & Center for Urban Economic Development, University of Illinois at Chicago. Nik Theodore is in the Department of Urban Planning and Policy & Center for Urban Economic Development, University of Illinois at Chicago. Neil Brenner is in the Department of Sociology & Metropolitan Studies Program, New York University. 50 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 embeddedness and path-dependency of neoliberal restructuring projects. In particular, this concept offers an analytical basis on which to explore the production of such projects within distinctive national, regional and lo- cal contexts, defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles. These consid- erations lead to a conceptualization of contemporary neoliberalization processes as catalysts for and expressions of an ongoing creative destruction of political-economic space at multiple geographical scales. Finally, we con – sider the role of urban spaces within the contradictory, chronically unstable and evolving geographies of actually existing neoliberalism. We argue that cities have become increasingly central to the reproduction, reconstitution and mutation of neoliberalism itself since the 1990s. The neoliberal Turn and the rule of markets Neoliberal ideology rests on the belief that open, competitive and unregu- lated markets, liberated from state interference and the actions of social collectivities, represent the optimal mechanism for socioeconomic devel – opment. Neoliberalism first gained prominence during the late 1970s as a strategic political response to the declining profitability of mass produc- tion industries and the crises of Keynesian-welfarism. In response to the breakdown of accumulation regimes and established systems of governance, national and local states throughout the older industrialized world began, if hesitantly at first, to dismantle the basic institutional components of the postwar settlement and to mobilize a range of policies intended to extend market discipline, competition and commodification throughout society. In this context, neoliberal doctrines were deployed to justify, inter alia, the deregulation of state control over industry, assaults on organized labor, the reduction of corporate taxes, the downsizing and/or privatization of public services and assets, the dismantling of welfare programs, the enhancement of international capital mobility, and the intensification of interlocality competition. Pinochet’s Chile represented the first example of neoliberal ‘shock treatment’, while Thatcherism and Reaganism were amongst its defining, vanguard projects. More moderate and muted forms of a neoliberal politics have also been mobilized in traditionally social-democratic or Christian- democratic states such as Canada, New Zealand, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Italy. Furthermore, following the debt crisis of the early 1980s, neoliberal programs of restructuring were extended selectively across the global South through the efforts of US-influenced multilateral agencies to subject peripheral and semi-peripheral states to the discipline of capital markets. By the mid-1980s, in the wake of this uneven but concerted realign- ment of policy agendas throughout the world, neoliberalism had become the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist globalization. While neoliberalism is often equated with global pressures, its quintes- sentially political character is underscored by its strong associations with various national projects of institutional restructuring over the past 30 years. However, neoliberalism is very much a multiscalar phenomenon: it 51 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns reconstitutes scaled relationships between institutions and economic actors, such as municipal governments, national states and financialized capital; and it leads to the substitution of competitive for redistributive regulatory logics while downloading risks and responsibilities to localities. Actually existing neoliberalisms Neoliberal ideology rests upon a starkly utopian vision of market rule, rooted in an idealized conception of competitive individualism and a deep antipathy to forms of social and institutional solidarity. Yet there are serious disjunctures between the ideology of neoliberalism and its everyday politi- cal operations and societal effects. 1 While neoliberalism aspires to create a utopia of free markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose versions of market rule and, subsequently, to manage the consequences and contradictions of such mar – ketization initiatives. Furthermore, whereas neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating markets generate an optimal allocation of investments and resources, neoliberal political practice has generated pervasive market fail- ures, new forms of social polarization, a dramatic intensification of uneven spatial development and a crisis of established modes of governance. The dysfunctional effects of neoliberal approaches to capitalist restructuring, which have been manifested at a range of spatial scales, 2 include persistent if uneven economic stagnation, intensifying inequality, destructive inter- locality competition, wide-ranging problems of regulatory coordination and generalized social insecurity. Crucially, the manifold disjunctures that have accompanied the trans- national extension of neoliberalism—between ideology and practice; doctrine and reality; vision and consequence—are not merely accidental side-effects of this disciplinary project; rather, they are among its most diagnostically and politically salient features. For this reason, an essentialized or purely definitional approach to the political economy of neoliberal restructuring contains significant analytical limitations. We are not dealing here with a coherently bounded ‘ism’, system, or ‘end-state’, but rather with an uneven, contradictory, and ongoing process of neoliberalization. 3 Hence, in the present context, the somewhat elusive phenomenon that needs definitional clarifi- cation must be interpreted as a historically specific, fungible, and unstable process of market-driven sociospatial transformation, rather than as a fully actualized policy regime, ideological apparatus, or regulatory framework. Neoliberalization thus refers to the prevailing pattern of market-oriented, market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring, one that is being realized across an uneven institutional landscape and in the context of heteroge- neous, coevolving political-economic processes. From this perspective, an adequate understanding of contemporary neoliberalization processes re – quires not only a grasp of their politico-ideological foundations but, just as importantly, a systematic inquiry into their multifarious institutional forms, developmental tendencies, diverse sociopolitical effects and multiple contradictions. While the ideology of neoliberalism rests on a deference to 52 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 a singular, ahistorical and uniquely efficient market, the infinitely more murky reality is that actually existing programs of neoliberalization are always contextually embedded and politically mediated, for all their generic features, family resemblances, and structural interconnections. Analyses of neoliberalization therefore confront this necessary hybridity, since it is not only difficult, but analytically and politically misleading, to visualize neoliberalism in ideal-typical terms, characterized by incipient or extant systemicity. Moreover, rather than standing alone, neoliberalism tends to exist in a kind of parasitical relation to other state and social formations (neoconser – vatism, authoritarianism, social democracy, etc.). The form and consequenc- es of neoliberalizing strategies of restructuring are shaped precisely in and through these hybrid contexts. 4 Just as the notion of a freestanding, self-regulating market has been ex- posed as a dangerously productive myth, 5 it is equally important to recognize that neoliberalism’s evo- cation of a spontaneous market order is a strong discourse 6—that is, a self- reinforcing myth rather than an accurate depiction of neoliberal statecraft. For this reason, processes of neoliberalization are inescapably embedded and context-contingent phenomena—even as their own discursive (mis) representations routinely seek to deny this very context-embeddedness. In light of this, neither deep forms of neoliberalization, nor the eco- logical dominance or tendential hegemony of neoliberalism at the global scale, 7 necessitate simple convergence in regulatory forms and institutional structures. Instead, neoliberalization is both predicated on and realized through uneven spatial development—its ‘natural state’ is characterized by an intensely variegated and persistently unstable topography. 8 Convergence on a unified and monolithic neoliberal end state should not be anticipated, let alone held up as some kind of lit – mus test for determining the extent of neoliberal transformation. Likewise, the long-run sustainability of any given neoliberal policy project (such as trade liberalization or welfare reform) is not required for there to be a neoliberaliza – tion of policy regimes; neoliberalization operates through trial-and-error experimentation, more often than not under conditions of crisis, leading in turn to deep regulatory failures and highly dysfunctional, disruptive consequences. Congruence and coherence across policy domains, therefore, are not prerequisites for an active program of neoliberalization to be under way. Rather, the critical signifiers of deep neoliberalization include: the growing ecological dominance of neoliberal structures, discourses, routines, and impulses within state formations; the intensification of regulatory re- The notion of a freestanding, self-regulating market has been exposed as a danger – ously productive myth. Neoliberalization is both predicated on and realized through uneven spatial de – velopment. 53 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns structuring efforts and crisis-driven responses within neoliberal parameters; and the mutual interpenetration, heightened congruence, and increased complementarity of neoliberal reforms. We conceptualize these ongoing, contextually embedded processes of neoliberalization through the concept of actually existing neoliberalism. This concept is intended to underscore not only the contradictory, destructive character of neoliberal policies, but also the ways in which neoliberal ideol- ogy systematically misrepresents the real effects of such policies upon the macroinstitutional structures and evolutionary trajectories of capitalism. Two issues in particular deserve attention. First, neoliberal doctrine repre- sents states and markets as if they reflect diametrically opposed principles of social and economic organization, rather than recognizing the politically constructed character of all economic relations. Second, neoliberal doct�rine is premised upon a one-size-fits-all model of policy implementation which assumes that identical results will follow the imposition of market-oriented reforms, rather than recognizing the extraordinary variations that arise as neoliberal reform initiatives are imposed within contextually specific institutional landscapes and policy environments. Neoliberalism, in these respects, both exploits and produces sociospatial difference. Uneven develop- ment does not signal some transitory stage, or interruption, on the path to ‘full’ neoliberalization; it represents a coevolving and codependent facet of the neoliberalization process itself. An analysis of actually existing neoliberalism, then, must begin by ex- ploring the entrenched landscapes of capitalist regulation, derived from the Fordist-Keynesian period of capitalist development, within which neoliberal programs were first mobilized following the geoeconomic crises of the early 1970s. From this perspective, the impacts of neoliberal restructuring strate- gies cannot be understood adequately through abstract or decontextualized debates regarding the relative merits of market-based reform initiatives or the purported limits of particular forms of state policy. Rather, an under – standing of actually existing neoliberalism requires an exploration of: • the historically specific regulatory landscapes and political settlements that prevailed within particular (national) territories during the Fordist- Keynesian period of capitalist development; • the historically specific patterns of crisis formation, uneven development and sociopolitical contestation that emerged within those territories fol- lowing the systemic crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian developmental model in the early 1970s; • the subsequent interaction of market-oriented, market-disciplinary (neo- liberal) initiatives with inherited regulatory frameworks, patterns of ter – ritorial development and sociopolitical alliances; and • the concomitant evolution of neoliberalizing policy agendas and restruc- turing strategies through their conflictual interaction with contextually specific political-economic conditions, regulatory arrangements and con – stellations of social and political power. In the remainder of this article, we analyze the spatialities and tempo- ralities of contemporary neoliberalization processes. After emphasizing the 54 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 path-dependent character of neoliberal reform initiatives, we call attention to the destructive and creative moments of the neoliberalization process. We conclude by considering the ways in which cities have become strategically essential arenas for neoliberalizing forms of policy experimentation and institutional restructuring. This, we argue, signals an important mutation in the nature of neoliberalization processes themselves since the early 1990s. Path-dependent neoliberalization The notion of actually existing neoliberalism is intended to illuminate the complex, contested ways in which neoliberal restructuring strategies interact with pre-existing uses of space, institutional configurations, and con�stella- tions of sociopolitical power. As we have emphasized, neoliberal programs of capitalist restructuring are never imposed in a pure form, for they are always introduced within politico-institutional contexts that have been molded significantly by inherited regulatory arrangements, institutional- ized practices and political compromises. 9 In this sense, the evolution of any politico-institutional configuration, following the imposition of neoliberal policy reforms, is likely to demonstrate strong properties of path-depen- dency in which established institutional arrangements significantly shape the scope and trajectory of reform. In this context, pre- or non-neoliberal institutions should not be seen simply as anachronistic institutional resi- dues, for their interpenetration with neoliberal forms of restructuring will shape pathways and outcomes in distinctive, generative, and contradictory ways. It follows that each hybrid form of neoliberalization—each actually existing neoliberalized formation—can be expected to be associated with its own, distinctive emergent properties. Varieties of neoliberalism, then, are more than contingently variable; they represent contextually specific, yet globally interconnected, conjunctural formations. This calls for situated analyses of specific hybrid formations in relation to broader, worldwide neoliberalization tendencies rather than attempts to catalogue the various ‘types’ of neoliberalism or to assess degrees of divergence from a putative American ‘norm’. 10 Neoliberal policy agendas have themselves been transformed through their intensive, conflictual interaction with inherited institutional land- scapes and power config- u r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e l a s t three decades. Neoliberal- ism has evolved consider- ably during the last three decades from a relatively abstract economic doctrine (its emergent form in the 1970s) and a means of dis- mantling established Keynesian-welfarist arrangements (its prevailing form in the 1980s) into, most recently, a reconstituted form of market-guided regulation, intended not only to animate surges of financialized economic The key point is that these politico- i d e o l o g i c a l s h i f t s h a v e e m e r g e d along a strongly path-dependent evolutionary trajectory. 55 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns growth, but also to manage some of the deep sociopolitical contradictions induced by earlier forms of market-disciplinary policy intervention. In the present context, the key point is that these politico-ideological shifts have emerged along a strongly path-dependent evolutionary trajectory. While first deployed as a strategic response to the crisis of an earlier political- economic framework (Fordist-Keynesian capitalism), neoliberal policies were subsequently modified qualitatively to confront a growing number of governance failures, crisis tendencies and contradictions, some of which were endogenous to neoliberalism as a politico-regulatory project itself, and some of which followed from context-specific regulatory dilemmas con- fronting particular hybrid formations. The transition from the orthodox, radically anti-statist neoliberalisms of Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s to the more socially-moderate and ameliorative neoliberalisms of Blair, Clinton and Schröder during the 1990s may therefore be understood as a path-dependent adjustment and reconstitution of neoliberal strategies in response to endogenous disruptions, dysfunctions and crisis tendencies. Even if, in an abstract sense, the broad contours of neoliberal projects ex- hibit a series of defining features—such as an orientation to export-oriented, financialized capital; a preference for non-bureaucratic modes of regulation; an antipathy towards sociospatial redistribution; and a structural inclina- tion toward market-like governance systems or private monopolies—the actually existing neoliberalisms of today are markedly different from their early 1980s predecessors. Correspondingly, we can expect the stakes, sites, structures and subjects of contemporary neoliberalization to be meaning- fully different in, for example, Berlin, Johannesburg, Seoul and Chicago. These localized neoliberalizations have each been rooted in distinctive crises of, and reactions to, their respective extant institutional orders, and they each signify unique conjunctural trajectories. Creatively destructive neoliberalism In order to grasp the path-dependent interactions between existing institu- tional forms and emergent neoliberal projects, we propose to analyze actu- ally existing neoliberalism with reference to two dialectically intertwined but analytically distinct moments—first, the (partial) destruction of extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market- oriented reform initiatives; and second, the (tendential) creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and capital-centric rule. Concrete programs of neoliberal restructuring tend to combine the rollback of oppositional institutional forms through the dismantling of collectivist, progressively redistributionist systems and the contradictory deregulation of economies, along with the rollout of new modes of institutional regulation and new forms of statecraft. 11 In this sense, neoliberalism should not be visualized as a coherent successor to Keynesian-welfarism in the Atlantic Fordist countries or, for that matter, as a successor to developmentalist states in the global South. For, in practice, programs of neoliberal restructuring are substantially ab- 56 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 sorbed with, first, the long-run and always-incomplete task of dismantling inherited institutional forms, and second, the challenge of managing the at- tendant economic consequences and social fallout from previous programs of neoliberalization. In contrast to the pristine discourses of competition and liberty that frame and legitimate neoliberal strategies, these forms of institutional reaction are not only more prosaic, they necessarily also entangle each and every neoliberal restructuring strategy with an endur – ing set of institutional legacies and coevolving conditions. This is not just to make the point that neoliberal strategies echo domestic politics, that they are path-dependent in some merely contingent manner, but rather to advance the much stronger claim that neoliberal strategies are deeply and indelibly shaped by diverse acts of institutional dissolution—in short, that the rollback face of neoliberalism is more than simply a ‘brush-clearing’ phase; it is integral to the dynamics, logics and trajectories of the re�gulatory transformations that are thereby unleashed. All actually existing neoliberalisms strongly bear the imprint of past regulatory struggles, which recursively shape political capacities and orienta- tions, and future pathways of neoliberal restructuring. And no single path or model should be considered paradigmatic (from which ‘deviations’ can be measured), since actually existing neoliberalisms are always, necessarily, conjuncturally specific. Conceptually, this speaks to the nature of neoliberal- ization as an open-ended process, rather than a phase or end state. Politically, this underlines the character of neoliberalization as a set of intersecting strategies of restructuring, rather than a stable and free-standing system. Two important caveats must be immediately added to clarify this conceptualization. First, while our emphasis on the tendentially creative ca – pacities of neoliberalism is at odds with earlier studies that underscor�ed its destructive character, we would argue that this double-pronged, dialectical conceptualization can help illuminate the complex, often highly contradic- tory trajectories of institutional change that have been generated through the deployment of neoliberal political programs. The point of this emphasis, however, is not to suggest that neoliberalism could somehow provide a basis for stable, reproducible capitalist growth, but rather to explore its wide- ranging, transformative impacts upon the inherited politico-institutional and geographical infrastructures of advanced capitalist states and econo- mies. This latter issue must be explored independently of the conventional question of whether or not a given institutional form promotes or under – mines sustainable capitalist growth. Even when neoliberal policy reforms fail to generate short- or medium-term bursts of capitalist growth, they may nonetheless impose much more lasting evolutionary ruptures within the institutionalized rules of the game and unevenly developed policy regimes associated with capitalist regulation. Second, it should be recognized that the destructive and creative moments of institutional change within actually existing neoliberalism are intimately and inextricably interconnected in practice. Our use of the term ‘moments’ to describe these interconnections is therefore intended to highlight conflictual yet mutually related elements within a dynamic, 57 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns dialectical process, rather than as a description of distinct temporal units within a linear transition. Again, the forms of actually existing neoliberal- isms—and indeed some of the defining features of neoliberalization itself as a real abstraction—are ‘reactive’ in the sense that they are shaped as much by their antipathies and antitheses (e.g., to Keynesian redistribution or to institutions of social solidarity) as by their stated, intrinsic goals of market transformation, the ‘end point’ of which is socially, ecologically, and indeed economically unrealizable. neoliberal urbanization and Its mutations The dynamic of creative destruction never occurs on a blank slate in which the ‘old order’ is abruptly obliterated and the ‘new order’ is unfurled as a fully formed totality. It occurs, rather, across a cluttered and contested institutional landscape in which newly emergent ‘projected spaces’ interact conflictually with inherited regulatory arrangements, leading in turn to new, unforeseen and often highly unstable layerings of political-economic space. 12 These recombinant amalgamations of inherited and emergent institutional arrangements also redefine the political arenas and stakes through which subsequent struggles over the regulation of capital accumulation, and its associated contradictions, will be articulated and fought out. The processes of creative destruction outlined above have been unfold- ing at a range of geographical scales and in a variety of institutional sites since the early 1970s. We argue that cities have become strategically impor – tant arenas in which neoliberal- izing forms of creative destruction have been unfolding. The central place of cities in Fordist-Keynesian systems of production and repro- duction defines them as key arenas (if not as targets) for neoliberal rollback strategies. Just as crucially, the strategic significance of cities as loci for innovation and growth, and as zones of devolved governance and local institutional experimentation, likewise positions them at the institutional and geographical forefront of neoliberal rollout programs. This is not to claim that the urban realm has achieved some form of scalar primacy in these after-Keynesian times, but simply to suggest that cities have become critical nodes, and points of ten- sion, in the evolving scalar politics of neoliberalization. While the processes of institutional creative destruction associated with actually existing neo- liberalism are clearly at work across all spatial scales, we argue that they are occurring with particular intensity at the urban scale. On the one hand, cities today are embedded within a highly uncertain geo-economic environment, characterized by monetary instability, specu- lative movements of financial capital, global location strategies by major transnational corporations and intensifying interlocal competition. 13 In Cities have become strate- gically important arenas in which neoliberalizing forms of creative destruction have been unfolding. 58 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 the context of this deepening global-local disorder, most local governments have been constrained, to some degree independently of their political ori- entation and national context, to adjust to heightened levels of economic uncertainty by engaging in short-termist forms of interspatial competition, place-marketing and regulatory undercutting in order to attract investment and jobs. 14 Meanwhile, the retrenchment of national welfare-state regimes and intergovernmental systems has likewise imposed powerful new fiscal constraints upon cities, leading to budgetary austerity in the face of pro- found socioeconomic dislocation and new competitive challenges. And in the face of this relatively weak fiscal capacity, cities must today manage a broad array of ‘downloaded’ regulatory responsibilities and socioeconomic risks, not least across the interrelated fields of economic development, social welfare and environmental sustainability. On the other hand, neoliberal programs have also been directly ‘in- teriorized’ into urban policy regimes as newly formed territorial alliances attempt to rejuvenate local economies through a ‘shock treatment’ of de- regulation, privatization, liberalization and enhanced fiscal austerity. In this context, cities and their suburban zones of influence have become increas- ingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for a variety of neoliberal policy experiments, from place-marketing, enterprise zones, local tax abatements, public-private partnerships and new forms of local boosterism, through to workfare policies, property redevelopment schemes, new strategies of social control, policing and surveillance, and a host of other institutional modifications within the local state apparatus. The overarching goal of such policy experiments is to mobilize city space as an arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consump- tion practices, while at the same time securing order and control amongst marginalized populations. Urban political-economic infrastructures have thus become basic preconditions for neoliberalized forms of capital accumulation and after- Keynesian strategies of regulation, even as they are simultaneously under – mined, destabilized and devalued in the process. Table One illustrates some of the many politico-institutional mechanisms through which neoliberal projects have been promoted in North American and western European cities during the past two decades, distinguishing in stylized form their constituent destructive and creative moments. Two aspects of the processes of creative destruction depicted in the table deserve explication. First, the different pathways of neoliberal urban restructuring that have crystallized throughout the older industrialized world reflect not only the diversity of neoliberal political projects, but also the contextually specific interactions of such projects with inherited and coevolving frameworks of urban political-economic regulation. An examination of the diverse path- ways through which neoliberal political agendas have been imposed upon and reproduced within cities is therefore central to any comprehensive inquiry into the geographies of actually existing neoliberalism. This raises the distinct possibility that the ‘family’ composed of diverse, putatively ‘hybrid’ neoliberalisms may be populated not only by national ‘varieties’ or 59 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns Recalibration of Intergovernmental relations • Dismantling of earlier systems of central • Devolution of tasks and responsibilities government support for municipal activities to municipalities • Creation of new incentive structures to reward local entrepreneurialism and to catalyze ‘endogeneous growth’ Retrenchment of public finance • Imposition of fiscal austerity measures upon • Creation of new revenue collection municipal governments districts and increased reliance on local revenues, user fees, and other instruments of private finance Restructuring the welfare state • Local relays of national welfare service • Expansion of community-based sec- provision are retrenched; assault on tors and private approaches to social managerial-welfarist local state apparatuses service provision • Imposition of mandatory work re- quirements on welfare recipients; new (local) forms of workfare experimen- tation Reconfiguring the institutional • Dismantling of bureaucratized, hierarchical • ‘Rolling forward’ of new networked infrastructure of the local state forms of local public administration forms of local governance based upon • Assault on traditional relays of local public-private partnerships, ‘quangos’ democratic accountability and the ‘new public management’ • Incorporation of elite business inter- ests in local policy and development Table 1. destructive and creative moments of neoliberal urbanization mechanisms of m oment of ‘destruction’ m oment of ‘creation’ neoliberal urbanization 60 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 Privatization of the local public sector and • Elimination of public monopolies for the • Privatization and outsourcing of collective infrastructures provision of municipal services (e.g. utilities, municipal services sanitation, mass transit) • Creation of new markets and inter- urban networks for service delivery and infrastructure maintenance Restructuring urban housing markets • Razing public housing and other forms of • Creation of new opportunities for low-rent accommodation speculative investment in central-city • Elimination of rent controls and project-based real estate markets construction subsidies • Transitional and ‘emergency’ provi- sion for the homeless • Introduction of market rents and tenant-based vouchers in low-rent niches of urban housing markets Reworking labor market regulation • Dismantling of traditional, publicly funded • Creation of a new regulatory environ- education, skills training and apprenticeship ments to encourage/sustain contin- programs for youth, displaced workers and gent employment the unemployed • Implementation of work-readiness programs aimed at the conscription of workers into low-wage jobs • Expansion of informal economies Restructuring strategies of territorial development • Dismantling of autocentric national models • Creation of free trade zones, enter- of capitalist growth prise zones and other ‘deregulated’ • Wind down compensatory regional policies spaces within major urban regions mechanisms of m oment of ‘destruction’ m oment of ‘creation’ neoliberal urbanization Table 1. Continued 61 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns • Increasing exposure of local and regional • Creation of new development areas, economies to global competitive forces technopoles and other ‘new industrial • Fragmentation of national space-economies spaces’ at subnational scales into discrete regional systems • Mobilization of new ‘glocal’ strategies intended to rechannel economic capacities and infrastructure invest- ments into ‘globally connected’ agglomerations Transformations of the built environment • Elimination and/or intensified surveillance of • Creation of privatized spaces of elite/ and urban form urban public spaces corporate consumption • Destruction of working class neighborhoods to • Construction of mega-projects to at- make way for speculative redevelopment tract corporate investment and recon- • Retreat from community-oriented planning figure local land-use patterns initiatives • Creation of gated communities, ur- ban enclaves and other ‘purified’ spaces of social reproduction • ‘Rolling forward’ of the gentrification frontier and the intensification of sociospatial polarization • Adoption of the principle of ‘highest and best use’ as the basis for major land use planning decisions Inter-local policy transfer • Erosion of contextually sensitive approaches • Diffusion of generic, prototypical ap- to local policymaking proaches to ‘modernizing’ reform • Marginalization of ‘home-grown’ solutions to among policymakers in search of localized market failures and governance failures ‘quick fixes’ for local social problems (e.g., workfare programs, zero-toler- ance crime policies) • Imposition of decontextualized ‘best practice’ models derived from extra- jurisdictional contexts 62 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 Reregulation of urban civil society • Destruction of the ‘liberal city’ in which all • Mobilization of zero-tolerance crime inhabitants are entitled to basic civil liberties, policies and ‘broken windows’ policing social services and political rights • Introduction of new discriminatory forms of surveillance and social con- trol • Introduction of policies to combat social ‘exclusion’ by reinserting indi- viduals into the labor market Re-representing the city • Performative discourses of urban disorder, • ‘Entrepreneurial’ discourses and ‘dangerous classes’ and economic decline representations focused on urban revitalization, reinvestment and rejuvenation m echanisms of m oment of ‘destruction’ m oment of ‘creation’ neoliberal urbanization Table 1. Continued 63 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns ‘models’, but may also include a series of characteristic urban formations and conjunctures, from core metropolises such as London and New York City to newly ascendant cities such as Lagos, Mumbai or Shanghai. A second issue concerns the evolution and/or reconstitution of neolib- eral forms of urban policy since their initial deployment in North American and western European cities during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Urban spaces have played strategically significant roles in successive waves of neo- liberalization. During the initial ascendancy of neoliberalism, cities b�ecame flashpoints both for major economic dislocations and for various forms of political struggle, particularly in the sphere of social reproduction. They were also among the principal battlegrounds for political struggles over the form and trajectory of economic restructuring during the protracted crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian growth regime. Consequently, local economic initiatives were adopted in many older industrial cities in order to promote renewed growth ‘from below’, while at the same time seeking to defend es- tablished sociopolitical settlements and redistributive arrangements. However, during the 1980s, when the rollback face of neoliberalism was often the dominant one, prevailing forms of urban policy shifted sig- nificantly. In this era of ‘lean government’, municipalities were increasingly induced or impelled to introduce various kinds of cost-cutting measures— including tax abatements, land grants, cutbacks in public services, the privatization of infrastructural facilities and so forth—in order to lower the short-term costs of administration and production within their jurisdic- tions, and thereby, to lubricate and accelerate external capital investment. Traditional Fordist-Keynesian forms of localized collective consumption were retrenched as fiscal austerity measures were imposed upon local govern- ments by neoliberalizing national states. Under these conditions, enhanced administrative efficiency, coupled with direct and indirect state subsidies to large corporations and an increasing privatization of social reproduction functions, were widely viewed as the ‘best practices’ for promoting a ‘good business climate’ within major cities. The contradictions of this zero-sum, cost-cutting form of urban entrepreneurialism are now clearly evident. In addition to their highly polarizing consequences, the effectiveness of such strategies for promoting economic rejuvenation has been shown to decline quite precipitously as they are diffused throughout the global urban sys- tem. 15 Ironically, the dominant response to these ‘diminishing returns’ of neoliberal urbanism has taken the form of redoubled efforts in the sphere of interurban competition. The subsequent consolidation of various forms of rollout neoliberal- ism since the early 1990s may be viewed as an evolutionary reconstitution of the neoliberal project in response to its own immanent contradictions and crisis-tendencies. In the last 15 years, a marked reconstitution of neoliberal strategies has occurred at the urban scale too. To be sure, the basic neoliberal imperative of mobilizing economic space as an arena for capitalist growth, commodification and market discipline has remained the dominant politi- cal project for municipal governments. Indeed, state institutions have been drawn into ever more explicit forms of the creative destruction of urban built environments in order to promote even more intensively marketized 64 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 land-use regimes. 16 However, amidst these market-disciplinary urban policy initiatives, the conditions for promoting and maintaining economic com- petitiveness have been reconceptualized by many local political-economic elites to include diverse administrative, social, and ecological criteria. The institutionally destructive neoliberalisms of the 1980s have thus been unevenly superseded by qualitatively new forms of neoliberal urban- ization that actively address the problem of establishing non-market forms of coordination and governance, through which to sustain market shares, competitive assets, and continued accumulation. Under these circumstances, neoliberal forms of institutional creation are no longer oriented, in a pure sense, towards the promotion of market-driven capitalist growth. Increas- ingly, they include efforts to establish various sorts of ‘flanking mechanisms’ and modes of crisis displacement designed to insulate powerful economic actors and interests from endemic failures in markets and governance regimes. Just as crucially, these mutations have also entailed a number of significant institutional realignments at the urban scale, including: the em – powerment of business-led networks and agencies in distributive struggles over resources; the mobilization of new forms of local economic develop- ment policy that embrace interfirm cooperation and industrial ‘clus�tering’; the deployment of community-based programs and shadow-state initiatives to combat social exclusion; the promotion of new forms of coordination and interorganizational networking among previously distinct spheres of local state intervention; and the creation of new regional institutions to promote metropolitan-wide place-marketing and (limited forms of) inter – governmental coordination. It follows that the creative destruction of institutional space at the urban scale does not take the form of a linear transition from a generic model of the ‘welfare city’ towards a new model of the ‘neoliberal city’. Rather, these multifaceted processes of local institutional transformation entail a contested, trial-and-error searching process, in which an ascendant repertoire of experimental strategies is being mobilized in place-specific forms and combinations. 17 However, even in their mature form, these strat – egies of neoliberal localization often exacerbate the regulatory problems they ostensibly seek to resolve—such as economic stagnation and un(der) employment—leading in turn to further rounds of unpredictable mutation. Consequently, the manifold forms and pathways of neoliberal urbanization should be seen not as coherent, sustainable solutions to the entrenched regulatory dilemmas and contradictions of contemporary capitalism, but rather as deeply contradictory restructuring strategies that are significantly destabilizing inherited landscapes of urban governance and socioeconomic regulation. The institutional landscape of neoliberal urbanism is conse- quently a churning, dynamic one, the continued turbulence of which is reflective of neoliberalism’s contradictory creativity—its capacity to repeatedly respond to endemic failures of policy design and implementation through a range of crisis-displacing strategies, fast-policy adjustments, and expe�rimen- tal reforms. The landscape of neoliberalization—its topographical surface—is therefore both uneven and unstable. 65 N e o l i b e r a l U r b a Ni s m : m o d e l s , m o m e Nt s , m U t a t i o Ns Conclusion: from neoliberalizing Cities to neoliberal urbanism? It is important to recognize that cities are not merely localized arenas in which externally generated projects of neoliberal restructuring are im- posed. On the contrary, cities have become increasingly central to the very reproduction, extension and mutation of neoliberalism itself. Indeed, a marked urbanization of neoliberalism has been occurring, as cities have be – come strategic targets and proving grounds for an increasingly broad range of neoliberal policy experiments, institutional innovations and political projects. Under these conditions, cities have become the incubators for, and generative nodes within, the reproduction of neoliberalism as a ‘living’ institutional regime. Moreover, just as cities are frequently positioned at the frontiers of neoliberal policy formation, experimentation and imple- mentation, so too do they become sites of concerted resistance to global, national and local neoliberalization projects. 18 Resistance, therefore, cannot be simplistically located ‘after’ neoliberalization—as an ex post facto response to an otherwise smoothly operating regulatory regime. On the contrary, a dialectics of intense, often bitter contestation have shaped each facet of, and moment in, the evolution of neoliberalism, from the earliest struggles around fiscal austerity and ‘rollbacks’ to the most audacious forms of late- neoliberal ‘rollout’. It remains to be seen whether the powerful contradictions inherent within the current urbanized formation of rollout neoliberalism will provide openings for more progressive, radical democratic reappropriations of city space, or if market-disciplinary, neoliberal agendas will be entrenched still further within the underlying institutional structures of urban governance. Should this latter outcome occur, we have every reason to anticipate the crystallization of still leaner and meaner urban geographies, in which cities� are compelled to engage aggressively in mutually destructive place-market- ing policies, in which transnational capital is relieved of its responsibilities for local social reproduction, and in which urban citizens are increasingly deprived of the power to shape the basic conditions of everyday urban life. In the short to medium term, these conditions largely define the terrain for struggles against neoliberalism in all its forms. It is worth recalling that just as neoliberalism exploited, and drew energy from, the crises of the Keynesian welfare state, it is equally likely that deepening crises within and around the project of neoliberalism will open up new strategic opportunities for both reformist and counter-hegemonic movements. There is nothing preordained about such struggles, of course, but it seems certain that the urban terrain will be a decisive battleground. Local struggles around fair housing, living wages, land use regimes and environmental justice, each in their different ways, expose pointedly relevant, progressive alternatives to neoliberalism. Rolling back neoliberalism, however, will also entail a pervasive reregulation of cities themselves, in the form of measures to tackle the corrosive effects of interurban competition, regressive redistribution and market-based development. One of the keys to the transcendence of neoliberalism is, therefore, the construction of new forms of urban solidarism, between as well as within cities. 66 SAIS Review W iN t e r –s p r i Ng 2009 Notes Acknowledgements. An earlier version of this paper was contributed to the Development models and logic of socio-economic organization in space (DEMOLOGOS) project, funded under the European Community’s Sixth Framework Programme (CIT2-CT-2004-505462). We would like to thank our collaborators on the project, especially Andreas Novy and Bob Jessop, for their inputs, though responsibility for the arguments here is ours. 1 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).2 Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed, 1997). Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, eds., Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe, (London: Blackwell, 2002). Stephen Gill, “Globalisation, market civilisation and disciplinary neoliberalism,” Millennium 24 (1995): 399–423. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Searching for a new institutional fix: The after-Fordist crisis and global-local disorder.” In Post-Fordism: A Reader, ed. A. Amin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 280–315. 3 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing space,” Antipode 34 (2002): 380–404.4 Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck, “Making global rules: globalization or neoliberalization? In Remaking the Global Economy: Economic-Geographical Perspectives, eds. J. Peck and H. W. Yeung (London: Sage, 2003), 163–81. 5 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1944).6 Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market (New York: Free Press, 1998). 7 Bob Jessop, “The crisis of the national spatio-temporal fix and the ecological dominance of globalizing capitalism,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24 (2000): 323–60. 8 Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore, “Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, modalities, pathways,” Global Networks (9), forthcoming, 2009. 9 See Jamie Peck, “Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism,” Progress in Human Geography 28 (2004): 392–405. 10 See Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, “Variegated capitalism,” Progress in Human Geography 31 (2007): 731–72. Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore, “Variegated neoliberaliza- tion” (2009). 11 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing space,” Antipode 34 (2002): 380–404.12 Alain Lipietz, “The national and the regional: their autonomy vis-à-vis the capitalist world crisis,” In Transcending the State-Global Divide, eds. R. Palan and B. Gills (Boulder: Lynne Ri- enner Publishers, 1994), 23–44. 13 Erik Swyngedouw, “The Mammon quest: ‘Glocalisation,’ interspatial competition and the monetary order: The construction of new scales.” In Cities and Regions in the New Europe, eds. M. Dunford and G. Kafkalas (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), 39–62. 14 Helga Leitner and Eric Sheppard, “Economic uncertainty, inter-urban competition and the efficacy of entrepreneurialism.” In The Entrepreneurial City, eds. T. Hall and P. Hubbard (Chichester: Wiley, 1998), 285–308. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Searching for a new in- stitutional fix: The after-Fordist crisis and global-local disorder.” In Post-Fordism: A Reader, ed. A. Amin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 280–315. 15 Helga Leitner and E. Sheppard, “Economic uncertainty, inter-urban competition and the efficacy of entrepreneurialism” (1998). 16 Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith, “The changing state of gentrification,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 92 (2001): 464–77. Rachel Weber, “Extracting value from the city: neoliberalism and urban redevelopment,” Antipode 34 (2002): 519–40. 17 Neil Brenner, New state spaces (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).18 Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric Sheppard (eds.), Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers (New York: Guilford, 2007). View publication stats
consists of 4 short answer questions and one long essay question. All answers must be written in your own words to demonstrate your comprehension and understanding of the material. Your answers shoul
The Global City: Introducing a Concept SASK A SASSEN Professor of Sociolog- University of Chicago EACH PHKSE IN THE LONG history of the world economy raises specific questions about the particular conditions that make it possible. One of the key properties of the current phase is the ascendance of information technologies and the associated increase in the mobility and liquidity of capital. There have long been cross-border economic pro- cesses–flows of capital, labor, goods, raw materials, tourists. But to a large extent these took place within the inter-state system, where the key articulators were national states. The international economic system was ensconced largely in this inter-state system. This has changed rather dramatically over the last decade as a result of privatization, 27 deregulation, the opening up of national economies to foreign firms, and the growing participation of national economic actors in global markets. It is in this context that we see a re-scaling of what are the strategic territories that articulate the new system. With the partial unbundling or at least weakening of the national as a spatial unit due to privatization and deregulation and the associated strengthening of globalization come conditions for the ascendance of other spatial units or scales. Among these are the sub-national, notably cities and regions; cross- border regions encompassing two or more sub-national entities; and supra-national entities, i.e. global digitalized markets and free trade blocs. The dynamics and processes that get terrritorialized at these diverse scales can in principle be regional, national or global. I locate the emergence of global cities in this context and against this range of instantiations of strategic scales and spatial units.’ In the case of global cities, the dy- namics and processes that get territorialized are global. S 4sKiA S.kssL- is the Ralph Lewis Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, and Centennial Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics. Her nenv book is Denationalization: Territor& Authority and Rights in a Global Digital Age (Princeton University Press 2005). Copyright © 2005 by the Brown Journal ofWorld Affair WINTER/SPRING 2005 -VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN ELEMENTS IN A NEW CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE The globalization of economic activity entails a new type of organizational structure. To capture this theoretically and empirically requires, correspondingly, a new type of conceptual architecture. 3 Constructs such as the global city and the global-city region are, in my reading, important elements in this new conceptual architecture. The activ- ity of naming these elements is part of the conceptual work. There are other closely linked terms which could conceivably have been used: world cities, 4 “supervilles,” 2 in- formational city. 5 Thus, choosing how to name a configuration has its own substantive rationality. When I first chose to use global city, 6 I did so knowingly-it was an attempt to name a difference: the specificity of the global as it gets structured in the contemporary period. I did not chose the obvious alternative, world city, because it had precisely the opposite attribute: it referred to a type of city which we have seen over the centuries, 7 in earlier periods in Asia’ and in European colonial centers. 9 In this regard, it can be said that most of today’s major global cities are also world cities, but that there may well be some global cities today that are not world cities in the full, rich sense of that term. This is partly an empirical question; further, as the global economy expands and incorpo- rates additional cities into the various networks, it is quite possible that the answer to 28 that particular question will vary. Thus, the fact that Miami has developed global city functions beginning in the late 1980s does not make it a world city in that older sense of the term. l° THE GLOBAL CITY MODEL: ORGANIZING HYPOTHESES There are seven hypotheses through which I organized the data and the theorization of the global city model. I will discuss each of these briefly as a way of producing a more precise representation. First, the geographic dispersal of economic activities that marks globalization, along with the simultaneous integration of such geographically dispersed activities, is a key factor feeding the growth and importance of central corporate functions. The more dispersed a firm’s operations across different countries, the more complex and strategic its central functions-that is, the work of managing, coordinating, servicing, financing a firm’s network of operations. Second, these central functions become so complex that increasingly the head- quarters of large global firms outsource them: they buy a share of their central func- tions from highly specialized service firms-accounting, legal, public relations, pro- gramming, telecommunications, and other such services. While even ten years ago the THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City: Introducing a Concept key site for the production of these central headquarter functions was the headquarters of a firm, today there is a second key site: the specialized service firms contracted by headquarters to produce some of these central functions or components of them. This is especially the case with firms involved in global markets and non-routine operations. But increasingly the headquarters of all large firms are buying more of such inputs rather than producing them in-house. Third, those specialized service firms engaged in the most complex and global- ized markets are subject to agglomeration economies. The complexity of the services they need to produce, the uncertainty of the markets they are involved with either directly or through the headquarters for which they are producing the services, and the growing importance of speed in all these transactions, is a mix of conditions that con- stitutes a new agglomeration dynamic. The mix of firms, talents, and expertise from a broad range of specialized fields makes a certain type of urban environment function as an information center. Being in a city becomes synonymous with being in an extremely intense and dense information loop. A fourth hypothesis, derived from the preceding one, is that the more headquar- ters outsource their most complex, unstandardized functions, particularly those sub- ject to uncertain and changing markets, the freer they are to opt for any location, because less work actually done in the headquarters is subject to agglomeration econo- mies. This further underlines that the key sector specifyring the distinctive production 29 advantages of global cities is the highly specialized and networked services sector. In developing this hypothesis I was responding to a very common notion that the number of headquarters is what specifies a global city. Empirically it may still be the case in many countries that the leading business center is also the leading concentration of headquarters, but this may well be because there is an absence of alternative locational options. But in countries with a well-developed infrastructure outside the leading busi- ness center, there are likely to be multiple locational options for such headquarters. Fifth, these specialized service firms need to provide a global service which has meant a global network of affiliates or some other form of partnership, and as a result we have seen a strengthening of cross border city-to-city transactions and networks. At the limit, this may well be the beginning of the formation of transnational urban sys- tems. The growth of global markets for finance and specialized services, the need for transnational servicing networks due to sharp increases in international investment, the reduced role of the government in the regulation of international economic activ- ity, and the corresponding ascendance of other institutional arenas-notably global markets and corporate headquarters-all point to the existence of a series of transnational networks of cities. WINTER/SPRING 2005 -VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN A related hypothesis for research is that the economic fortunes of these cities become increasingly disconnected from their broader hinterlands or even their na- tional economies. We can see here the formation, at least incipient, of transnational urban systems. To a large extent major business centers in the world today draw their importance from these transnational networks. There is no such thing as a single global city-and in this sense there is a sharp contrast with the erstwhile capitals of empires. A sixth hypothesis, is that the growing numbers of high-level professionals and high profit making specialized service firms have the effect of raising the degree of spatial and socio-economic inequality evident in these cities. The strategic role of these specialized services as inputs raises the value of top level professionals and their num- bers. Further, the fact that talent can matter enormously for the quality of these strate- gic outputs and, given the importance of speed, proven talent is an added value, the structure of rewards is likely to experience rapid increases. Types of activities and work- ers lacking these attributes, whether manufacturing or industrial services, are likely to get caught in the opposite cycle. A seventh hypothesis, is that one result of the dynamics described in hypothesis six, is the growing informalization of a range of economic activities which find their effective demand in these cities, yet have profit rates that do not allow them to compete for various resources with the high-profit making firms at the top of the system. 30 Informalizing part of or all production and distribution activities, including services, is one way of surviving under these conditions. RECOVERING PLACE AND WORK-PROCESS In the first four hypotheses, I attempted to qualify what was emerging in the 1980s as a dominant discourse on globalization, technology, and cities which posited the end of cities as important economic units or scales. I saw a tendency in that account to take the existence of a global economic system as a given, a function of the power of transnational corporations and global communications. My counter argument is that the capabilities for global operation, coordination, and control contained in the new information technologies and in the power of transnational corporations need to be actualized. By focusing on the production of these capabilities we add a neglected dimension to the familiar issue of the power of large corporations and the capacity of the new technologies to neutralize distance and place. A focus on the production of these capabilities shifts the emphasis to the practices that constitute what we call economic globalization and global control. THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City: Introducing a Concept Further, a focus on practices draws the categories of place and work process 0 4 into the analysis of economic globalization. These are two categories easily overlooked in accounts centered on the hypermobility of capital and the power of transnationals. Developing categories such as place and work process does not negate the central- ity of hypermobility and power. Rather, it brings to the fore the fact that many of the resources necessary for global economic activities are not hypermobile and are, in- deed, deeply embedded in place, notably places such asPhoto Courtesy ofHilary Koo-S global cities, global-city re- Video stills from “The Paraculture,” under product gions, and export processing at ZKI by Hilary Koob-Sassen (Germany, 2003-4 zones. This entails a whole in- frastructure of activities, firms, and jobs which are necessary to run the advanced cor- porate economy. These industries are typically conceptualized in terms of the hypermobility of their outputs and the high levels of expertise of their professionals rather than in terms of the production or work process involved and the requisite infrastructure of facilities and non-expert jobs that are also part of these industries. Focusing on the work process brings with it an emphasis on economic and spatial polarization because of the disproportionate concentration of very high and very low income jobs in these major global city sectors. Emphasizing place, infrastructure, and non-expert jobs matters precisely because so much of the focus has been on the neutral- ization of geography and place made possible by the new technologies. The growth of networked cross-border dynamics among global cities includes a broad range of domains: political, cultural, social, and criminal. There are cross-border transactions among immigrant communities and communities of origin, and a greater intensity in the use of these networks once they become established, including for Lssen ion WINTER/SPRING 2005 * VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN economic activities. We also see greater cross-border networks for cultural purposes, as in the growth of international markets for art and a transnational class of curators; and for non-formal political purposes, as in the growth of transnational networks of activ- ists around environmental causes, human rights, and so on. These are largely city-to- city cross-border networks, or, at least, it appears at this time to be simpler to capture the existence and modalities of these networks at the city level. The same can be said for the new cross border criminal networks. Recapturing the geography of places involved in globalization allows us to recap- ture people, workers, communities, and more specifically, the many different work cultures, besides the corporate culture, involved in the work of globalization. It also brings with it an enormous research agenda, one that goes beyond the by now familiar focus on cross-border flows of goods, capital, and information. Finally, by emphasizing the fact that global processes are at least partly embedded in national territories, such a focus introduces new variables in current conceptions about economic globalization and the shrinking regulatory role of the state.”‘ That is to say, the space economy for major new transnational economic processes diverges in significant ways from the duality global/national presupposed in many analyses of the global economy. The duality, national versus global, suggests two mutually exclusive spaces-where one begins the other ends. One of the outcomes of a global city analysis 32 is that it makes evident that the global materializes by necessity in specific places, and institutional arrangements, a good number of which, if not most, are located in na- tional territories. WORLDWIDE NETWoRKS AND CrxnAL COMMAND FucnrIONS The geography of globalization contains both a dynamic of dispersal and of centraliza- tion. The massive trends towards the spatial dispersal of economic activities at the metropolitan, national, and global level which we associate with globalization have contributed to a demand for new forms of territorial centralization of top-level man- agement and control functions. Insofar as these functions benefit from agglomeration economies even in the face of telematic integration of a firm’s globally dispersed manu- facturing and service operations, they tend to locate in cities. This raises a question as to why they should benefit from agglomertion economies, especially since globalized economic sectors tend to be intensive users of the new telecommunications and com- puter technologies, and increasingly produce a partly de-materialized output, such as financial instruments and specialized services. There is growing evidence that business networks are a crucial variable that is to be distinguished from technical networks. Such business networks have been crucial long before the current technologies were THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City: Introducing a Concept developed. Business networks benefit from agglomeration economies and hence thrive in cities even today when simultaneous global communication is possible. Elsewhere I examine this issue and find that the key variable contributing to the spatial concentra- tion of central functions and associated agglomeration economies is the extent to which this dispersal occurs under conditions of concentration in control, ownership, and profit appropriation. 12 This dynamic of simultaneous geographic dispersal and concentra- tion is one of the key elements in the organizational architecture of the global economic system. Let me first give some empirical referents and then examine some of the implica- tions for theorizing the impact of globalization and the new technolo- gies on cities. Inside countries, the leading financial centers today concentrate a greater share of national financial activity than even ten years ago, and internationally, cities in the global North concentrate well over half of the global capital market. The rapid growth of affiliates illustrates the dynamic of simultaneous geographic dispersal and concentration of a firm’s operations. By 1999 firms had well over half a million affiliates outside their home countries accounting for US$ 11 trillion in sales, a very significant figure if we consider that global trade stood at US$ 8 trillion. Firms with large numbers of geographically dispersed factories and service outlets face mas- sive new needs for central coordination and servicing, especially when their affiliates involve foreign countries with different legal and accounting systems. Another instance today of this negotiation between a global cross-border dy- namic and territorially specific site is that of the global financial markets. The orders of magnitude in these transactions have risen sharply, as illustrated by the USS 192 tril- lion for 2002 in traded derivatives, a major component of the global economy and one that dwarfs the value of global trade which stood at USS 8 trillion. These transactions are partly embedded in electronic systems that make possible the instantaneous trans- mission of money and information around the globe. Much attention has gone to this capacity for instantaneous transmission of the new technologies. But the other half of the story is the extent to which the global financial markets are located in an expanding network of cities, with a disproportionate concentration in cities of the global North. Indeed, the degrees of concentration internationally and within countries are unex- pectedly high for an increasingly globalized and digitized economic sector. Inside coun- tries, the leading financial centers today concentrate a greater share of national finan- cial activity than even ten years ago, and internationally, cities in the global North concentrate well over half of the global capital market. This is a subject I discuss em- WINTER/SPRING 2005 * VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN pirically in a later section. One of the components of the global capital market is stock markets. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the addition of markets such as Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, Mexico City, Bangkok, Taipei, Moscow, and growing numbers of non-national firms listed in most of these markets. The growing number of stock markets has contributed to raise the capital that can be mobilized through these markets, reflected in the sharp worldwide growth of stock market capitalization which reached over US$ 24 trillion in 2000 and US$ 36 trillion in 2001. This globally integrated stock market which makes possible the circulation of publicly listed shares around the globe in seconds is embed- ded in a grid of very material, physical, strategic places. The specific forms assumed by globalization over the last decade have created particular organizational requirements. The emergence of global markets for finance and specialized services, the growth of investment as a major type of international transaction, all have contributed to the expansion in command functions and in the demand for specialized services for firms. 13 By central functions I do not only mean top level headquarters; I am referring to all the top level financial, legal, accounting, managerial, executive, planning functions necessary to run a corporate organization operating in more than one country, and increasingly in several countries. These central functions are partly embedded in head- 34 quarters, but also in good part in what has been called the corporate services complex, that is, the network of financial, legal, accounting, advertising firms that handle the complexities of operating in more than one national legal system, national accounting system, advertising culture, etc. and do so under conditions of rapid innovations in all these fields. Such services have become so specialized and complex that headquarters increasingly buy them from specialized firms rather than producing them in-house. These agglomerations of firms producing central functions for the management and coordination of global economic systems, are disproportionately concentrated in the highly developed countries-particularly, though not exclusively, in global cities. Such concentrations of functions represent a strategic factor in the organization of the global economy, and they are situated in an expanding network of global cities. 4 It is important analytically to unbundle strategic functions for the global economy or for global operation, and the overall corporate economy of a country. These global control and command functions are partly embedded in national corporate structures, but also constitute a distinct corporate subsector. This subsector can be conceived as part of a network that connects global cities across the world through firms’ affiliates or other representative offices.’ 5 For the purposes of certain kinds of inquiry this distinc- tion may not matter; for the purposes of understanding the global economy, it does. THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City: Introducing a Concept This distinction also matters for questions of regulation, notably regulation of cross-border activities. If the strategic central functions-both those produced in cor- porate headquarters and those produced in the specialized corporate services sector- are located in a network of major financial and business centers, the question of regulat- ing what amounts to a key part of the global economy will entail a different type of effort from what would be the case if the strategic management and coordination func- tions were as distributed geographically as the factories, service outlets, and affiliates generally. We can also read this as a strategic geography for political activisms that seek accountability from major corporate actors, among others concerning environmental standards and workplace standards. National and global markets as well as globally integrated organizations require central places where the work of globalization gets done. Finance and advanced corpo- rate services are industries producing the organizational commodities necessary for the implementation and management of global economic systems. Cities are preferred sites for the production of these services, particularly the most innovative, speculative, inter- nationalized service sectors. Further, leading firms in information industries require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with hyper-concentration of fa- cilities; we need to distinguish between the capacity for global transmission/communi- cation and the material conditions that make this possible. Finally, even the most ad- vanced information industries have a production process that is at least partly place- 35 bound because of the combination of resources it requires even when the outputs are hypermobile. Theoretically, this addresses two key issues in current debates and scholarship. One of these is the complex articulation between capital fixity and capital mobility, and the other is the position of cities in a global economy. Elsewhere I have developed the thesis that capital mobility cannot be reduced simply to that which moves nor can it be reduced to the technologies that facilitate movement. Rather, multiple components of what we keep thinking of as capital fixity are actually components of capital mobility. This conceptualization allows us to reposition the role of cities in an increasingly glo- balizing world, in that they contain the resources that enable firms and markets to have global operations. 6 The mobility of capital, whether in the form of investments, trade or overseas affiliates, needs to be managed, serviced, coordinated. These are often rather place-bound, yet are key components of capital mobility. Finally, states, place-bound institutional orders-have played an often crucial role in producing regulatory envi- ronments that facilitate the implementation of cross-border operations for their na- tional and for foreign firms, investors, and markets. 7 WINTERISPRING 2005 * VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN In brief, a focus on cities makes it possible to recognize the anchoring of multiple cross-border dynamics in a network of places, prominent among which are cities, par- ticularly global cities or those with global city functions. This in turn anchors various features of globalization in the specific conditions and histories of these cities, in their variable articulations with their national economies and with various world economies across time and place. 8 This optic on globalization contributes to identifying a com- plex organizational architecture which cuts across borders, and is both partly de-terri- torialized and partly spatially concentrated in cities. Further, it creates an enormous research agenda in that every particular national or urban economy has its specific and inherited modes of articulating with current global circuits. Once we have more infor- mation about this variance we may also be able to establish whether position in the global hierarchy makes a difference and the various ways in which it might do so. IMPACTS OF NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES ON CENTRALITY Cities have historically provided national economies, polities, and societies with some- thing we can think of as centrality. In terms of their economic function, cities provide agglomeration economies, massive concentrations of information on the latest devel- opments, a marketplace. The question here is: how do the new technologies of com- 36 munication alter the role of centrality and hence of cities as economic entities. As earlier sections have indicated, centrality remains a key feature of today’s glo- bal economy. But today there is no longer a simple, straightforward relation between centrality and such geographic entities as the downtown, or the central business district (CBD). In the past, and up to quite recently in fact, the center was synonymous with the downtown or the CBD. Today, partly as a result of the new communication tech- nologies, the spatial correlates of the center can assume several geographic forms, rang- ing from the CBD to a new global grid of cities. Simply, one can identify three forms assumed by centrality today.’ 9 First, while there is no longer a simple straightforward relation between centrality and such geo- graphic entities as the downtown, as was the case in the past, the CBD remains a key form of centrality. But the CBD in major international business centers is one pro- foundly reconfigured by technological and economic change. Second, the center can extend into a metropolitan area in the form of a grid of nodes of intense business activity, a case well illustrated by recent developments in cities as diverse as Buenos Aires 2° and Paris. 2 One might ask whether a spatial organi- zation characterized by dense strategic nodes spread over a broader region does or does not constitute a new form of organizing the territory of the “center,” rather than, as in the more conventional view, an instance of suburbanization or geographic dispersal. THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City: Introducing a Concept Insofar as these various nodes are articulated through cyber-routes or digital highways, they represent a new geographic correlate of the most advanced type of “center.” The places that fall outside this new grid of digital highways, however, are peripheralized. This regional grid of There is little doubt that connecting to nodes represents, in my analysis, a re- global circuits has brought with it a constitution of the concept of region. Far from neutralizing geography, the significant level of development…[and] regional grid is likely to be embedded economic dynamism. But the question in conventional forms of communica- tions infrastructure, notably rapid rail and highways connecting to airports. Ironically perhaps, conventional infrastructure are likely to maximize the economic benefits derived from telematics. I think this is an important issue that has been lost somewhat in discussions about the neutralization of geography through telematics. Third, we are seeing the formation of a transterritorial “center” constituted via telematics and intense economic transactions. The most powerful of these new geogra- phies of centrality at the inter-urban level binds the major international financial and business centers: New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sydney, Hong Kong, among others.2 But this geography now also includes 31 cities such as Sao Paulo and Mexico City. The intensity of transactions among these cities, particularly through the financial markets, trade in services, and investment has increased sharply, and so have the orders of magnitude involved. Finally, we see emer- gent regional hierarchies, as is illustrated by the growth corridors in Southeast Asia, 23 the case of Sao Paulo in the Mercosur free-trade area z4 and by the relation between the participating entities in the Iran-Dubai corridor. 25 Besides their impact on the spatial correlates of centrality, the new communica- tion technologies can also be expected to have an impact on inequality between cities and inside cities. There is an expectation in much of the literature on these technolo- gies that they will override older hierarchies and spatial inequalities through the univer- salizing of connectivity that they represent. The available evidence suggests that this is not quite the case. Whether it is the network of financial centers and foreign direct investment patterns discussed here, or the more specific examinations of the spatial organization of various cities, the new communication technologies have not reduced hierarchy nor spatial inequalities.2 And this is so even in the face of massive upgradings and state of the art infrastructure in a growing number of cities worldwide. There is little doubt that connecting to global circuits has brought with it a significant level of development of expanded central urban areas and metropolitan grids of business nodes, WINTER/SPRING 2005 • VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN and considerable economic dynamism. But the question of inequality has not been engaged. Further, the pronounced orientation to the world markets evident in many of these cities raises questions about the articulation with their nation-states, their re- The emphasis on the transnational and hypermobile character of capital has contributed to a sense of powerlessness among local actors…But an analysis that emphasizes place suggests that the new global grid of strategic sites is a terrain for politics and engagement. gions, and the larger economic and social structure in such cities. Cities have typically been deeply embedded in the economies of their region, indeed often reflect- ing the characteristics of the lat- ter; and they still do. But cities that are strategic sites in the global economy tend, in part, to discon- nect from their region. This con- flicts with a key proposition in tra- ditional scholarship about urban systems, namely, that these systems promote the territorial integration of regional and national economies. There has been a sharpening inequality in the concentration of strategic resources and activities between each of these cities and others in the same 38 country, though this tends to be evident only at fairly disaggregated levels of evidence. For example, Mexico City today concentrates a higher share of some types of economic activity and value production than it did in the past, 27 but to see this requires a very particularized set of analyses. 28 THE GLOBAL CITY AS A NExus FOR NEw PoLIncO-CULTURAL ALIGNMENTS The incorporation of cities into a new cross-border geography of centrality also signals the emergence of a parallel political geography. Major cities have emerged as a strategic site not only for global capital, but also for the transnationalization of labor and the formation of translocal communities and identities. 29 In this regard, cities are a site for new types of political operations and for a whole range of new “cultural” and subjective operations.” The centrality of place in a context of global processes makes possible a transnational economic and political opening for the formation of new claims and hence for the constitution of entitlements, notably rights to place. At the limit, this could be an opening for new forms of “citizenship.” 22 The emphasis on the transnational and hypermobile character of capital has con- tributed to a sense of powerlessness among local actors, a sense of the futility of resis- tance. But an analysis that emphasizes place suggests that the new global grid of strate- THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City: Introducing a Concept gic sites is a terrain for politics and engagement 23 The loss of power at the national level produces the possibility for new forms of power and politics at the sub-national level. Further, insofar as the national as container of social process and power is cracked, -” it opens up possibilities for a geography of politics that links sub-national spaces across borders. 25 Cities are foremost in this new geography. This engenders questions of how and whether we are seeing the formation of a new type of transnational politics that localizes in these cities. Immigration, for instance, is one major process through which a new transnational political economy and trans-local household strategies are being constituted. It is one largely embedded in major cities insofar as these concentrate most immigrants, cer- tainly in the developed world, whether in the United States, Japan, or Western Europe. It is, in my reading, one of the constitutive processes of globalization today, even though not recognized or represented as such in mainstream accounts of the global economy.26 Global capital and the new immigrant workforce are two major instances of transnationalized actors that each have unifring properties across borders internally, and find themselves in contestation with each other inside global cities, Researching and theorizing these issues will require approaches that diverge from the more tradi- tional studies of political elites, local party politics, neighborhood associations, immi- grant communities, and so on through which the political landscape of cities and metropolitan regions has been conceptualized in urban studies. One way of thinking about the political implications of this strategic transnational space anchored in global cities is in terms of the formation of new claims on that space. The global city particularly has emerged as a site for new claims: by global capital, which uses the global city as an “organizational commodity,” but also by disadvantaged sectors of the urban population, frequently as internationalized a presence in global cities as capital. The “de-nationalizing” of urban space and the formation of new claims by transnational actors, raise the question: Whose city is it? The global city and the network of these cities is a space that is both place- centered in that it is embedded in particular and strategic locations; and it is transterritorial because it connects sites that are not geographically proximate yet are intensely connected to each other. If we consider that global cities concentrate both the leading sectors of global capital and a growing share of disadvantaged populations (immigrants, many of the disadvantaged women, people of color generally, and, in the megacities of developing countries, masses of shanty dwellers) then we can see that cities have become a strategic terrain for a whole series of conflicts and contradictions. We can then think of cities also as one of the sites for the contradictions of the global- ization of capital, even though, heeding Katznelson’s 8 observation, the city cannot be reduced to this dynamic. WINTER/SPRING 2005 • VOLUME Xl, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN CONCLUSION An examination of globalization through the concept of the global city introduces a strong emphasis on strategic components of the global economy rather than the broader and more diffuse homogenizing dynamics we associate with the globalization of con- sumer markets. Consequently, this also brings an emphasis on questions of power and inequality. It brings an emphasis on the actual work of managing, servicing, and fi- nancing a global economy. Second, a focus on the city in studying globalization will tend to bring to the fore the growing inequalities between highly provisioned and profoundly disadvantaged sectors and spaces of the city, and hence such a focus intro- duces yet another formulation of questions of power and inequality. Third, the concept of the global city brings a strong emphasis on the networked economy because of the nature of the industries that tend to be located there: finance and specialized services, the new multimedia sectors, and telecommunications services. These industries are characterized by cross-border networks and specialized divisions of functions among cities rather than inter-national competition per se. In the case of global finance and the leading specialized services catering to global firms and mar- kets-law, accounting, credit rating, telecommunications-it is clear that we are deal- ing with a cross-border system, one that is embedded in a series of cities, each possibly 40 part of a different country. It is a de-facto global system. Fourth, a focus on networked cross-border dynamics among global cities also allows us to capture more readily the growing intensity of such transactions in other domains-political, cultural, social, and criminal. Global cities around the world are the terrain where a multiplicity of globaliza- tion processes assume concrete, localized forms. These localized forms are, in good part, what globalization is about. Recovering place means recovering the multiplicity of presences in this landscape. The large city of today has emerged as a strategic site for a whole range of new types of operations-political, economic, “cultural,” subjective. It is one of the nexi where the formation of new claims, by both the powerful and the disadvantaged, materializes and assumes concrete forms. 0 Noms 1. Saskia Sassen, “Digital Networks and the State: Some Governance Questions,” Theorf Culture, and Society 17 (2000): 19-33. Saskia Sassen, “Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global Elements for Theo- rization,” Public Culture 12 (2000): 215-32. Saskia Sassen, “Territory and Territoriality in the Global Economy,” International Sociology 15 (2000): 372-93. 2. Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). 3. Here Arrighi’s analysis is of interest, in that it posits the recurrence of certain organizational patterns in different phases of the capitalist world economy, but at higher orders of complexity and expanded THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City Introducing a Concept scope, and timed to follow or precede particular configurations of the world economy. See, Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London and New York. Verso, 1994). 4. Originally attributed to Goethe, the term was re-launched in the work of Peter Hall, The wrld Cities (New Yori McGraw-Hill, 1966), and more recently re-specified by John Friedmann and Wolff Goetz, World City Formation: An Agendafir Research and Action (Los Angeles: Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning, UCLA, 1982). See also, R Stren, “The Studies of Cities: Popular Perceptions, Aca- demic Disciplines, and Emerging Agendas,” in M. Cohen, B. Ruble, J. Tulchin, and A. Garland, eds., Prepanng fir the Urban Future: Global Pressures and Local Forces (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996). 5. Manuel Castells, The Informational City: Information Technologp Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 6. Braudel (1984), op. cit. 7. Ibid.; Peter Hall (1966), op. cit.; Anthony D. King, Urbansm, Colonialism, and the World Economy: Culture and Spatial Foundations (London and New York Routledge, 1990). 8. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Bejflre European Hegemony: the World System A. D. 1250-1350 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 9. King (1990), op. cit. 10. See also Abu-Lughod (1999), op. cit.; John Rennie Short and Yeong-Hyun Kim, Globalization and the City (Essex- Addison Welsley Longman, 1999). A. Sachar, “The Global Economy and the World Cities,” in A. Sachar and S. Oberg, eds., The WorldEconomy and the Spatial Oeganizauion of/hur(Aldershoe Avebury, 1990). 11. See generally, Kris Olds, Peter Dicken, Philip E Kelly, Lilly Kong, and Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, eds., Globalization and the Asia-Pacific. Contested Territories (London: Roudedge, 1999). 12. Saskia Sassen, “The New Labor Demand in Global Cities,” in M.P Smith, eds., Cities in Tranufr- mation (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 2001): Chapters Two and Five. 13. A central proposition here, developed at length in my work, is that we cannot take the existence of 41 a global economic system as a given, but rather need to examine the particular ways in which the condi- ions for economic globalization are produced. This requires examining not only communication capaci- ties and the power of multinationals, but also the infrastructure of facilities and work processes necessary for the implementation of global economic systems, induding the production of those inputs that consti- tute the capability for global control and the infirasructure of jobs involved in this production. The em- phasis shifts to the practice of global control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and management of a global production system and a global marketplace for finance, both under conditions of economic concentration.The recovery of place and production also implies that global processes can be studied in great empirical detail. 14. We are seeing the formation of an economic complex with a valorization dynamic that has proper- ties dearly distinguishing it from other economic complexes whose valorization dynamic is far more articulated with the public economic functions of the state, the quintessential example being Fordist manufacturing. Global markets in finance and advanced services partly operate rhrough a “regulatory” umbrella that is not state-centered but market-centered. This in turn brings up a question of control linked to the currently inadequate capacities to govern transactions in electronic space. 15. In this sense, global cities are different from the old capitals of erstwhile empires, in that they are a function of crossborder networks rather than simply the most powerful city of an empire. There is, in my conceptualization, no such entity as a single global city as there could be a single capital of an empire; the category global city only makes sense as a component of a global network of strategic sites. The corporate subsector whcih contains the global control and command functions is partly embedded in this netowrk. 16. There are multiple specifications to this argument. For instance, and going in the opposiute direc- tion, the development of financial instruments that represent fixed real estate repositions the latter in various systems of circulation, induding global ones. In so doing the meaning of capital fixity is partly transformed and the fixed capital also becomes a site for circulation. For a fuller elaboration see Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tok)-,, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), Chapter Two. WINTERISPRING 2005 -VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2 SASKIA SASSEN 17. Sassen (2001), op. cit. 18. Carl Abbott, “The Internationalization ofWashington D.C.,” UrbanAffairs Review 31, no. 5 (199 6): 571-594; Abu-Lughod (1999), op. cit.; John Allen, Doreen Massey, and Michael Pryke, eds., Unsettling Cities (London: Routledge, 1999); Allan Cochrane, Jamie Peck, and Adam Tickell, “Manchester Plays Games: Exploring the Local Politics of Globalization,” Urban Studies 33 no. 80 (1996): 1319-13336; Fu- chen Lo and Yue-man Yeung, eds., Emerging World Cities in Pacific Asia (Tokyo: United Nations Univer- sity Press, 1996); M. M.A. De Souze Santos, and M.L. Silveira, eds., Territorio: Globalizacao eFragmentacao. (Sao Paul: Editorial Hucitec, 1994). 19. There is a fourth case which I have addressed elsewhere (Sassen (2001), op. cit.: Chapters Four and Five), which is represented by new forms of centrality constituted in electronically generated spaces. 20. Pablo Ciccolella and Iliana Mignaqui, “Buenos Aires: Sociospatial Impacts of the Development of Global City Functions,” in Saskia Sassen, ed., Global Networks/ Linked Cities (New York and London: Routledge, 2002): 309-325. 21. Pierre Veltz, Mondialisation Villes Et Territoires (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996); Josse Landrieu, Nicole May, Dirige Par, Therese Spector, and Pierre Veltz, eds., La VilleExclatee (LaTour d’Aigues: Editiones de l’Aube, 1998). 22. In the case of a complex landscape such as Europe’s, we see in fact several geographies of centrality, one global, others continental and regional. A central urban hierarchy connects major cities, many of which in turn play central roles in the wider global system of cities: Paris, London, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Zurich. These cities are also part of a wider network of European financial/cultural/service capitals, some with only one, others with several of these functions, articulate the European region and are somewhat less oriented to the global economy than Paris, Frankfurt, or London. And then there are several geographies of marginality: the East-West divide and the North- South divide across Europe as well as newer divisions. In Eastern Europe, certain cities and regions, notably Budapest, are rather attractive for purposes of in- vestment, both European and non-European, while others will increasingly fall behind, notably in Ruma- nia, Yugoslavia, and Albania. We see a similar differentiation in the south of Europe: Madrid, Barcelona, 42 and Milan are gaining in the new European hierarchy; Naples, Rome, and Marseilles are not. 23. Lo and Yeung (1996), op. cit. 24. Sueli Ramos, “Sao Paulo: Articulating a Cross-Border Region,” in Sassen (2002), op. cit. 25. Ali Parsa and Ramin Keivani, “The Hormuz Corridor: Building a Cross-Border Region Between Iran and the United Arab Emirates,” in Sassen (2002), op. cit.:145-182. 26. Stephen Graham 2002, “Communication Grids: Cities and Infrastructure,” in Sassen (2002), op. cit.: 71-91; Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: NetworkedInfrastructures, Techno- logical Mobilities, and the Urban Condition (London: Routledge, 2001); Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 27. This also holds in the highly developed world. For instance, the Paris region accounts for over forty percent of all producer services in France, and over eighty percent of the most advanced ones. New York City is estimated to account for between a fourth and a fifth of all US producer services exports though it has only three percent of the U.S. population. London accounts for forty percent of all exports of pro- ducer services in the U.K. Similar trends are also evident in Zurich, Frankfurt, and Tokyo, all located in much smaller countries. 28. Cristof Parnreiter, “Mexico: The Making of a Global City,” in Sassen (2002), op. cit.: 145-182. 29. David Smith, “The Urban Sociology Meets the Old: Re-reading Some Classical Human Ecology,” Urban Affairs Review 30, no.3 (1995): 432-457. 30. Jantet L. Abu-Lughod, From Urban Village to “East Village ” The Battlefo r New York’s Lower East Side (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994); Nira Yuval-Davis, “Ethnicity, Gender Relations, and the Multiculturalism,” in R. Torres, L. Miron, and J.X. Inda, eds., Race, Identity and Citizenship (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub- lishers, 1999): 112-125; Richard Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: the Design and Social Life of Cities (New York: WW Norton, 1992). 31. James Holston and Arjun Appadurai, “Cities and Citizenship,” Public Culture 8, no. 2 (1996): 187- 204; Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Miron, and Jonathan Xavier Inda (1999), op. cit. 32. John Allen, Doreen Massey, and Michael Pryke, eds., Unsettling Cities (London: Routledge, 1999); THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS The Global City: Introducing a Concept King (1996), op. cit; Abu-Lughod (1994) op. cit; Joan Copjec and Michael Sorkin, eds., Giving Ground” The Politics of Propinquity (New York. Verso, 1999); E. Berner and R, Korff, “Globalization and Local Resistance: The Creation of Localities in Manila and Bangkok,” International Journal of Urban and Re- gionalRsear”h 19, no. 2 (1995): 208-222. 33. Peter J. Taylor, ‘World Cities and Territorial States: The Rise and Fall of their Mutuality,” in Peter Taylor and EL Knox, eds., World Cities in a World-Ssem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); A. Sachar, ‘The Global Economy and World Cities,’ in A. Sachar and S. Odberg, eds., The WorldEconomy and the Spatial Organization of Power (Aldershot Avebury, 1990). 34. Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discountnts (New York- New York Press, 1998): Chapter One and Ten. 35. Sassen (1998) op. cit: Part One; Ronald Skeldon, Rehcan nEiles?Migravion from Hog Kong andthe New Ownreas Cinese (Armonk, New York. M.E. Sharpe, 1994). 36. Frank Bonilla, Edwin Melendez, Rebecca Morales, and Maria de los Angeles Torres, Bonierlm Bor- der: U.S. Latinos, Latin Americans, and the Panrdox of Intenipendence (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). Sassen (2000a, b), op. cit.; Sassen (1998), op. cit: Chapter One. 37. Ira Kaznelson, Marxism in the Cit (Oxford and New York. Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1992). 43 WINTERISPRING 2005 -VOLUME XI, ISSUE 2