Ld7

To determine whether Johnny’s Eighth Amendment rights were
violated, we need to explore the exact wording of the Eighth
Amendment, which is more difficult than it sounds. The term
“cruel and unusual punishment” is left undefined and, thus, the
Eighth Amendment is subject to broad interpretation.

While most Supreme Court cases interpreting the Eighth
Amendment involve challenges to the death penalty, the Supreme
Court also reviews prisoner challenges to life-without-parole
sentences.

In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), for example, the Supreme
Court held that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment for a
judge to sentence a petty criminal to life imprisonment without the
opportunity for parole for writing a bad check. However, in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the Supreme Court
held that it was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment for a
state judge to sentence a first time offender to life in prison
without the opportunity for parole for a drug offense.

In relevant part, the Supreme Court in Hamelin held that the
Eighth Amendment only prohibits “grossly disproportionate”
sentences. Therefore, it is not necessary for a sentence to be
directly proportional to the crime.

SOLEM V. HELM
In 1979, Jerry Helm (the case’s defendant; Solem was the warden
of the South Dakota State Penitentiary at the time) was convicted
for passing a “no account” check in the amount of $100. Under
ordinary circumstances, the maximum sentence was five years in
prison and a $5,000 fine. Helm was sentenced to life without
possibility of parole, however, because South Dakota law meant
that his prior felony convictions, although nonviolent, brought a

special sentencing guideline into play. Previously, Helm had been
convicted of burglary, grand larceny, and driving while intoxicated.

In 1986, Ronald A. Harmelin was convicted of possessing more
than 650 grams (about two pounds) of cocaine, and sentenced to
life without parole, according to the mandatory sentencing
guidelines in Michigan. The State Court of Appeals rejected his
appeal which was made on the grounds that the sentence was
“cruel and unusual” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Harmelin claimed that the sentence was “significantly
disproportionate” to is crime.

TWO CHALLENGES

In the case of Solem v. Helm, the court held that the cruel and
unusual provision only barred barbaric punishments and
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime.

In Harmelin v. Michigan, the sentence was not found to be cruel
and unusual, because of the interpretation through precedent in
capita cases that the provision does not apply to noncapital
crimes.

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

In addition to examining life sentences, the Supreme Court has
also reviewed whether the conditions of a prisoner’s
imprisonment may violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.

For example, the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, held that a
prisoner can sue prison doctors for their failure to provide
adequate medical treatment if the prisoner can prove that doctors
were “deliberately indifferent.”

Estelle v. Gamble
What is considered “reasonable” medical care for prisoners is
built on Estelle v. Gamble (1976), in which the Court ruled on “the
evolving standard of decency” for prison medical care.

The restriction against cruel and unusual punishment was applied
to health care of those in prison, so the Court ruled that denying
medically necessary care violated the Eighth Amendment, writing
that, “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” was the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

The Court outlined three medical care rights that prisoners are
entitled to:

1. Access to medical care for diagnosis and treatment;
2. A professional medical judgment; and
3. Administration of the treatment prescribed by the physician.

These same standards apply to pretrial detainees and juveniles in
detention, via the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Plaintiffs must prove a “serious medical need”—
defined as anything that causes unnecessary pain, a measurable
deterioration in organ or body function, death or substantial risk to
public health—at trial. Such a serious medical need is defined as
a health condition that will result in.

“Deliberate indifference” to such conditions is a phrase that was
defined through the courts as well. In Farmer v. Brennan (1994)
the Supreme Court gave some direction as to what it meant by
the phrase by ruling that a prisoner must only demonstrate that
medical needs were known about and ignored. It is a subjective
test, but it is built on the objective test of medical need.

In the 1990s, some states enacted so-called enhanced
sentencing or “three strikes laws” requiring the imposition of
mandatory life sentences to those convicted of three felonies.
Some court cases have alleged that such laws violate the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.

Background of Gary Ewing

Before he came up for trial under the three strikes law, Gary
Ewing had committed other, more serious, offenses, served his
time, and been released. Here is a description of his most serious
previous crimes:

Ewing’s most recent prior convictions were three home burglaries
in an apartment complex, including one in which he threatened
someone at knifepoint and another in which the victim was home
at the time of his forced entry. When arrested, he was found to
have the knife on his person.

In a challenge to California’s three strikes law, one life-long
criminal, Gary Ewing was sentenced to life in prison after a
shoplifting conviction. This case asks if 25 years to life when the
defendant has been convicted of two previous times for grand
theft violates the Eighth Amendment.

The majority in Ewing v. California (2003) held that the “three
strikes” law was not “grossly disproportionate” and did not violate
the Eighth Amendment because the sentence factored in his long
criminal history that included several violent crimes.

However, in dissent, four Supreme Court Justices held that Ewing
would not have received a similar sentence in many other states
for the same crime. Moreover, the dissenters argued that a life

sentence for shoplifting was “grossly disproportionate” and that
Ewing’s prior crimes should not have impacted his sentencing.